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本土无晶圆厂业者们真正需要的策略

中国的无晶圆厂(Fabless)公司数量至少有450多家,而现在的问题是,在几年之后,有多少家能真正存活下来;更重要的是,他们将如何成长茁壮,在全球市场发挥影响力?

根据报导,中国的无晶圆厂(Fabless)公司数量至少有450多家,而现在的问题是,在几年之后,有多少家能真正存活下来;更重要的是,他们将如何成长茁壮,在全球市场发挥影响力? 在本刊最近进行的一系列本土IC业者报导中,本土一些业界高阶主管们指出,在假设这些无晶圆厂都继续他们当前业务模式的情况下,至少还要2~10年的时间,才能看出这些骤然崛起的企业们会消失或是走上正轨。 从根本上来看,大家对该产业未来前景的看法与猜测都有很大不同,但基本上大家似乎都同意,以目前中国的无晶圆厂模式来看,要长期维持下去似乎不大可能。中国企业不能仅仰赖今天的成本优势或劳动力优势来维持成长。然而,残酷的事实是,在中国,成本优势已经让很多公司雇用了二位或是三倍的工程师。而这股趋势也让美国的工程师更加感到恐慌。 北京WestSummit资本管理公司的创始合伙人,董事总经理陈大同指出,与美国公司相比,若一家中国公司有100个工程师,他们只需要美国工程师设计所需的三分之一时间,就能快速设计出产品。 芯原科技(VeriSilicon)总裁戴伟民同意这个观点。 当被问到“为什么选择中国,”时,戴伟民的回答简短有力:“美国太贵了。台湾工程师品质很好,但数量不足以满足我们的需求;而印度则是还没有准备好。”而在营运成本部份,若美国是一的话,台湾大约是三分之一,而中国大约是五分之一,戴伟民表示。至于工程品质方面,戴伟民指出,年轻的中国工程师可能还很嫩,但我们可以给他们最好的设计流程和工具,以弥补他们缺乏经验这一点。“在芯原,我们每周都tape-out一款芯片,”他说。尽管芯原在全球各地拥有多个办事处,但芯原在中国的员工人数共有380人,其中250人位在上海的总部。 然而,芯原的戴伟民也对中国无晶圆厂提出警告,若未能发展出独特的商业模式,“未来两年内许多业务都将无以为继”。芯原和eSilicon与OpenSilicon类似,都是快速成长的“IC设计代工” 供货商,主要是为客户提供硅解决方案和SoC的一站式服务。本质上,芯原并不提供芯片业务。相反,它是服务型企业──利用自己的IP,或是来自其它第三方伙伴的IP为客户设计芯片撇开商业模式问题不谈,目前,现实问题在于,中国的工程师成本也日渐升高。 一些报导指出,中国的工程管理人员薪资并不低,以公司设在北京的工程部副总裁这类高阶主管来看,他们的薪资都已经在2007~2008年时达到高峰,而设计工程师的薪资则仍在上升。因此,为了维持利润率,许多公司开始向中国西部出发,寻找更便宜的设计工程师。 ARM中国总裁吴雄昂认为,以今天中国的无晶圆厂模式来看,最大的陷阱就在于有太多同构型太高的本地公司,他们的产品竞争非常激烈。这种模式必然不会长久。而这也是新思科技(Synopsys)全球副总裁、亚太区总裁潘建岳所说的,中国无晶圆厂必须掌握创新的力量才能生存下去。 潘建岳指出,“如果你想在全球市场中插一脚,你就会需要全球性的人才和全球供应链。” 他们学得多快? 但是,潘建岳并不认为中国无晶圆公司必须从头开始。他解释道,中国企业应该积极招聘欧洲和日本的工程技术人才。“看看三星如何从日本人那里学习半导体技术。”潘建岳列举了一些韩国企业的做法──也许在二十年前,当时韩国企业每个周末都邀请日本工程师到韩国去;韩国人会问一些问题,日本工程师回答后,他们便一起打高尔夫球,接着送日本工程师回家──他们的商业机秘就在“第19洞”。 当然,中国无晶圆公司现正面临着一个更大挑战:缺乏经验丰富的管理技能。WestSummit的陈大同指出,“确实,很多中国无晶圆公司今天都是由“海归派”在经营,但这些公司中,有许多都缺乏 专业行销知识,而且几乎没有任何管理经验。”他表示,问题在于“他们学习的速度能有多快?”陈大同本身是在美国拿到学位,并在硅工作一段时间后才回国; 他曾在1995年与伙伴共同创立Omnivision,同时也出任展讯(Spreadtrum)的首席技术官。 Synopsys 的潘建岳也有类似的看法。他指出,缺乏管理能力是一大问题。他指出,要经营一家规模达十亿美元的公司,你所需要的技巧会与经营一家规模一亿美元的公司截然 不同。他以一家由三人共同成立的家庭式无晶圆厂公司为例指出,你可能只需要埋头工作,直到让公司成长为20人甚至100人的中小型企业。然而,这种模式却不能应用在2,000人的公司中。潘建岳表示,中国的高阶主管通常都是好学生,但问题是,他们学得有多快?这个学习过程可能会长达数年之久。 ARM的吴雄昂认为,缺乏执行经验的公司,有时也会展现在无法良好定义市场方面。一旦无法明确地定义市场,就容易导致更高的产品开发成本,或是让他们错失商机。 本文授权编译自EE Times,版权所有,谢绝转载 本文下一页:中国灵敏的反应才是重点!

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高通选择代工伙伴的纠结之心
无晶圆厂经营模式在14nm的鸡血下仍将坚挺
李力游是如何让展讯起死回生的cynesmc

{pagination} 并购潮 然而,当前中国成功的无晶圆公司们,几乎都有着共同的故事:藉由并购及收购来强化自身能力。 2007 年底,展讯收购Quorum Systems就是很好的例子。Quorum是一家位在圣地亚哥的无晶圆厂半导体公司,主业是设计高整合CMOS射频收发器。去年,展讯还收购了 MobilePeak Holdings Ltd. 48.4%的股权,MobilePeak也是一家无晶圆厂芯片公司,在圣地亚哥和上海设有公司,主要产品是UMTS/HSPA+调制解调器芯片组。 在最近一次接受本刊的采访过程中,展讯CEO李力游表示,他希望展讯能被认为是一家“能提供美国技术和中国服务态度的公司”。“你常然不会希望人们认为你是一家提供中国技术和美国态度的公司,”李力游笑道。 在中国,购并风潮正迅速蔓延。今年稍早,上海的锐迪科微电子(RDA Microelectronics)和Trident Microsystems签署了一项IP授权和发展协议。 RDA将支付1,600万美元现金,以获得为期10年的非排他性、全球性、不可转让的授权,用于开发、生产和销售 Trident SX5 数字电视SoC平台的衍生版本。 RDA CEO戴保家在最近与本刊的访谈中表示,该公司之前并没有进军DTV SoC市场的计画。他解释道,收购IP更像是一种防守动作。但他仍然表示,“即使我们在IPTV市场是后进者,但我们仍拥有一个巨大优势。因为我们熟知本地市场。” 在中国,大家都承认,不仅工程成本上扬,现在各种基础建设的成本也不断攀升。而当被问到中国的无晶圆厂业务还能持续多久时,Synopsys的潘建岳看来有些犹豫,接着他表示,“五年。”然而,他立即改口,“或许还有10年。” 中国灵敏的反应才是重点! 他的乐观并非来自中国的成本竞争力,而是速度。他对中国能迅速对市场做出反应的能力深具信心。随着所有关键的组件供货商和制造商纷纷在中国设立公司(更不用提在中国拥有OEM客户的公司了),中国当地正在形成一个巨大的生态系统,这将让中国的无晶圆厂业务模式更能发挥效率。在这里,没有延迟、不用开冗长的电 话会议,可以立即做出决定。这个生态系统也能让当地厂商们从仅生产简单的“me-too”产品,进阶成可提供加值型系统的厂商,甚至开始开发软件。 另一个让中国无晶圆厂乐观的原因,是晨星(MStar)和联发科(MediaTek)这两家台湾IC设计大厂在手机、数字电视领域的成功经验。这两家大家所称的“M brothers”是许多中国无晶圆厂半导体公司正在试图模仿一个成功蓝图。晨星和联发科已经体认到,为客户提供完整软硬件解决方案具有重大意义。“这两 家公司一直维持着较低的成本结构,而且已透过全球供应链实现全球化经营,”潘建岳表示。 编译: Joy Teng 本文授权编译自EE Times,版权所有,谢绝转载 本文下一页:参考英文原文: How long for China to sort out fabless strategy?,by Junko Yoshida

相关阅读:
高通选择代工伙伴的纠结之心
无晶圆厂经营模式在14nm的鸡血下仍将坚挺
李力游是如何让展讯起死回生的cynesmc

{pagination} How long for China to sort out fabless strategy? Junko Yoshida BEIJING – With reportedly 450-plus fabless chip companies in China, it’s fair to ask how many more years can they survive in this business and, more important, what they must do now to grow into a significant force in the global market. (Editor's note: How Chinese fabless companies have gotten to where they are today is examined in the previous article entitled "Is China's fabless model sustainable?") In a series of interviews recently conducted in China by EE Times, Chinese executives estimated another two to 10 years before these fabless upstarts either become irrelevant or go out of business—assuming that they keep doing what they’re doing right now. In essence, while this window of opportunity differs from guess to guess, everyone seems to agree that China’s current fabless model isn’t sustainable for the long haul. Chinese companies can’t keep growing simply by relying on today’s cost advantage, and working even harder without sleep. However, the hard truth is that the cost advantage in China has been driving many companies to double or the number of triple engineers they hire. In turn, this trend instills fear – warranted or unwarranted – among engineers whose jobs are still in the United States. As Datong Chen, managing director of Beijing’s WestSummit Capital Management, pointed out, if a company has 100 engineers in China, it can design a product at a sixth or an eighth the cost of the United States, and in one-third the time. Wayne Dai, company president and CEO at VeriSilicon, echoes this point. When asked “why China,” Dai simply said: “The United State is too expensive. Taiwan is good but doesn’t have enough of the engineers [we want], and India isn’t ready.” As far as the cost of doing business is concerned, if the U.S. is one, Taiwan is about one-third, and China comes out to be one-fifth on average, Dai said. Asked about the quality of engineers, Dai said that young Chinese engineers may be green, but given the best design flows and tools, their energy compensates for their inexperience. “We tape out one chip per week at VeriSilicon,” he added. While the company has multiple offices throughout the world, VeriSilicon has a total of 380 people working in China – 250 based in Shanghai. But it was VeriSilicon’s Dai who sounded the alarm that Chinese fabless companies “will go out of business within the next two years” without a unique business model. VeriSilicon, similar to eSilicon and OpenSilicon, is a fast-growing “IC design foundry” which offers its customers silicon solutions and SoC turnkey services. VeriSilicon, in essence, is not in the business of making their own chips. Rather, it’s in the service business – designing chips for clients, leveraging VeriSilicon’s own IP’s and those from other sources. How long for China to sort out fabless strategy? Setting aside the business-model issue, the reality is that the cost of engineers has also been rising in China. Some report that high-end salaries for Chinese engineering managers – such as a VP of engineering based in Beijing – might have already peaked in 2007 – 2008. But the price of design engineers is still going up. Hence, companies looking to keep their gross margin low are going westward in China in search of cheaper design engineers. The biggest trap Allen Wu, president of ARM China sees in China’s fabless model today is that there are just too many local companies who compete purely on cost with similar products. That isn’t sustainable. And it’s why Jian-Yue Pan, corporate vice president, Asia Pacific region at Synopysis, is convinced that the survival of fabless China hinges on companies’ power to innovate. “You need to move up the innovation ladder.” Pan said, “If you want to play in the global market, you need global talents and global supply chain.” How fast can they learn? Pan, however, isn’t suggesting that Chinese fabless companies need to invent everything from scratch. Chinese management shouldn’t shy away from actively hiring engineering talent from Japan and Europe, he explained. “Look at how Samsung learned semiconductor expertise from Japanese engineers.” Pan is referring to the somewhat infamous practice – maybe a couple of decades ago – when Korean companies invited Japanese engineers to Korea over weekends; Koreans ask a few questions, Japanese engineers answer, they play golf together, and the Japanese engineers go home — leaving their trade secrets at the “19th hole.” Of course, this poses an even bigger challenge Chinese fabless companies face: a lack of experienced management skills. WestSummit’s Chen said, “Yes, a lot of Chinese fabless companies today are run by so-called ‘returnees.’ But many of them have little marketing expertise and practically no management experience.” Chen said that the question is: “How fast can they learn?” Chen himself returned to China after getting his higher education in the United States and worked in Silicon Valley; he co-founded Omnivision in 1995, and he was also Spreadtrum’s CTO. Synopsys’ Pan has similar views. Lack of management capabilities is a big issue, he noted. “To run a $1 billion company, you need a different skill set from the one you used in running a $100 million company.” Take the example of a fabless company, say, founded by three members of the same family. “You may be able to grow that business with no process and no system in place – simply by working very hard, to a 20-people company or even a 100-people company,” he said. But that won’t work with 2,000 people. Pan said, “Chinese executives are good learners. But the question is how fast can they learn? It could take years.” ARM’s Wu sees that this lack of executive experience can sometimes manifest itself in misdefinition of a market. The inability to clearly define a particular segment of the market to go after with new products could cost the business dearly, or result in a blown opportunity. M&A waves However, some of the success stories emerging from the current generation of China fabless companies have a common thread: an ability to pull off mergers and acquisitions. One good example is Spreadtrum’s late 2007 acquisition of Quorum Systems, a San Diego-based fabless semiconductor company that specializes in the design of highly integrated CMOS radio frequency transceivers. Last year, Spreadtrum also acquired 48.4% of MobilePeak Holdings Ltd., a fabless chip company that designs UMTS/HSPA+ modem chipsets from bases in San Diego, California and Shanghai, China. As Spreadtrum’s CEO Leo Li proudly put it in a recent interview with EE Times, Spreadtrum wants to be known as a company that offers “U.S. technology with a China attitude.” Li chuckled, “You certainly don’t want to be known as someone to offer ‘Chinese technology with a U.S. attitude.” Kidding aside, the M&A waves are spreading fast. Earlier this year, RDA Microelectronics in Shanghai (a fabless semiconductor company that designs, develops and markets Radio Frequency and mixed-signal semiconductors for cellular, connectivity and broadcast applications) signed an IP license and development agreement with Trident Microsystems. RDA will pay US$16 million in cash to secure a non-exclusive, worldwide, non-transferrable license to develop, manufacture and sell derivative versions of the Trident SX5 Digital TV SoC platform for a period of 10 years. Vincent Tai, RDA’s CEO, in a recent interview with EE Times, said the company’s entry in to the DTV SoC market isn’t planned until later. Its IP acquisition was more a defensive move, he explained. But he remained confident: “Even if we are a latecomer to the IPTV market, I know I have a huge advantage. Being a local, we know the local market.” There’s no denying the rise of not only engineering costs but also the cost of infrastructure in China. Asked how long China’s fabless companies can sustain their business, Synopsys’ Pan, with a little hesitation, first said, “Five years.” But then he immediately corrected himself, “Perhaps another 10 years.” It's China's speed, stupid! His optimism comes not from China’s cost-competitiveness, but from speed. He has faith in China’s ability to respond to the market quickly. With all the key component suppliers and the manufacturing base on hand in China (not to mention OEM customers in China), a vast, locally available eco-system lets Chinese fabless companies do business much more effectively. No time lag, no lengthy conference calls and no delayed decision making. It also allows them to expand from simply rolling out me-too products to offering value-added systems or even developing software. Another source of optimism for fabless China comes from the recent success of MStar and MediaTek – two Taiwanese giants who took the global semiconductor market by storm for mobiles and digital TVs. The so-called “M brothers” drew a blueprint for success that many Chinese fabless companies are trying to emulate. MStar and MediaTek have figured out the significant importance in providing their customers with turnkey software and hardware solutions. “The two companies kept the cost structure relatively low and yet totally globalized theiroperations, by using global supply chains,” observed Pan.
责编:Quentin
本文为国际电子商情原创文章,未经授权禁止转载。请尊重知识产权,违者本司保留追究责任的权利。
Junko Yoshida
ASPENCORE全球联席总编辑,首席国际特派记者。曾任把口记者(beat reporter)和EE Times主编的Junko Yoshida现在把更多时间用来报道全球电子行业,尤其关注中国。 她的关注重点一直是新兴技术和商业模式,新一代消费电子产品往往诞生于此。 她现在正在增加对中国半导体制造商的报道,撰写关于晶圆厂和无晶圆厂制造商的规划。 此外,她还为EE Times的Designlines栏目提供汽车、物联网和无线/网络服务相关内容。 自1990年以来,她一直在为EE Times提供内容。
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