惠普认列80亿美元商誉摊销费用，财政状况堪忧

尽管在惠普公司(Hewlett-Packard Co.)宣布第三季认列80亿美元巨额的商誉摊销费用，但是这家集计算机、咨询、服务与企业硬件于一体的公司，目前仍陷于负债困境中，而且对于投资人的吸引力也一样十分有限。再者，任何对于HP资产负债金额之高感到惊讶的人，应该可以预期该公司还将出现下一波大规模的商誉摊销费用。 当然，惠普可能将未来的商誉摊销分成几次较小的金额，但与被迫认列80亿美元商誉摊销同样的情况也将迫使该公司在未来采取类似的步骤。惠普必须减轻其资产负债表的负担，并摆脱有损商誉的数字。在最近这一次商誉减损发布以前，惠普在截止于4月30日的上季营收中，资产负债表上的商誉数字为449亿美元，使该公司的总资产达到1,278亿美元。 然而，其中有一大部份的资产只是空壳。例如，商誉累积被视为资产的一部份，但惠普从过去十年来一连串收购行动后已使基本资产价值大幅下降了。例如最近这项与商誉减损有关的支出只计入该公司的服务部门，而它最主要就与2008年以139亿美元收购Electronic Data Systems (EDS)公司有关。 惠普公司的资产负债表上还有其它可能得再进行商誉减损的大型收购交易，其中以在2011年以100亿美元收购Autonomy公司的交易最受争议。去年八月，惠普在宣布收购交易的前一天支付了比Autonomy公司收盘价更高64%的溢价。这一收购交易招致投资社群大肆批评惠普为这家英国企业信息管理软件 公司付出太大的代价。 惠普公司认为，在收购Autonomy与EDS等交易后造成的商誉资产帐面价值降低，并不至于“导致未来的现金支出或以其它方式，影响服务部门当前的业务或财务表现，”该公司在一份声明中表示。这听起来没错，但其实很荒谬。在该公司原本认为稳健的交易却带来财务冲击后，也对投资人和股东带来突如其来的负担。 以下是我对惠普目前情况的一些看法。惠普为收购Autonomy公司支付了102亿美元，较Autonomy在利息、税项、折旧与摊销前的盈利更高24倍。 而在收购Autonomy以前，惠普还以12亿美元收购了Palm。但这次的收购交易随后也导致惠普认列了约10亿美元的商誉减损。 惠普还曾经在2010年分别以15亿美元与23.5亿美元收购了ArcSight以及3Par。溢付给这些公司的费用对于惠普公司的资产负债表带来沉重的负担，严重地影响该公司的财务状况。同时，尽管惠普或其它处于类似情况的公司可能声称商誉支出并非现金交易，也不会伤害企业的长期发展基础，但事实上这却象征最初的实际货币(或股 票)支出。无论如何形容资产帐面价值降低，总之都等于承认对于资源误用，同时也显示部分主管和董事会的判断力不足。 这一切都对于企业的长期发展带来了重大影响。这些事件造成对于该公司资深主管是否适任的质疑，同时也动摇员工对于这些主管的信任。例如，如果惠普公司现在还 宣布大型收购行动，我还会相信这家公司吗？有谁会相信管理团队已经尽力调查过了？相信公司已经慎重思考过长期信托责任，而非率性而为？投资者显然认为惠普 并不是一个投资焦点，原因当然包括其长久来的收购策略。 惠普公司的财务现况已经相当疲弱(截至4月季度结束的长期债务为260亿美元、83亿美元现金以及短期投资)，如果在新任CEO Meg Whitman的带领下仍追逐类似于先前三位CEO的收购策略，那么惠普公司的处境将会变得更加疲弱。 惠普前任CEO Carly Fiorina、Mark Hurd与Lo Apotheker为惠普公司划下了深深的伤口，也难以抹灭。 本文授权编译自EBN Online，版权所有，谢绝转载 编译：Susan Hong 参考英文原文：HP's Financial Wounds Are Still Festering，by Bolaji Ojo

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{pagination} HP's Financial Wounds Are Still Festering Bolaji Ojo Even after Hewlett-Packard Co. (NYSE: HPQ) took a hefty $8 billion impairment charge to clear some of the burdensome goodwill on its balance sheet, the computer, consulting, services, and enterprise hardware company remains mired in debt and continues to hold limited attraction for investors. Furthermore, anyone surprised by the size of HP's "goodwill" write-down should expect even bigger "one-time" charges in future. Of course, HP may parcel out future charges in smaller chunks, but the same logic that forced the $8 billion charge announced earlier this month will force the company to take similar steps in future. The company must lighten its balance sheet and get rid of unsightly goodwill numbers that are like horrid scars on its corporate face. Before the latest impairment charge, HP's net goodwill as at the end of the fiscal quarter ended April 30 was a titanic $44.9 billion, helping to boost the company's total assets to $127.8 billion. A large chunk of the "assets" is empty gas, though. The accumulated goodwill, for instance, is treated as an asset, even though the value of the underlying "assets" has fallen precipitously since HP began piling them up with a spate of acquisitions over the last ten years. The latest charge, for instance, is assigned only to the company's services business and is related primarily to the $13.9 billion purchase of Electronic Data Systems in 2008. Other large acquisition-related goodwill exists on HP's balance sheet, but none is more controversial than the $10 billion purchase of Autonomy Corp. in 2011. HP paid a whopping 64 percent premium on Autonomy's closing stock price one day prior to the announcement of the transaction last August. Many in the investment community panned the acquisition on the conviction that HP overpaid for the British enterprise information management software company. I didn't like it either because it represents some of what is wrong with the company today. (See: Five Sources of Risk in 2011.) HP insists the goodwill write-downs that follow transactions like the purchase of Autonomy and EDS do not "result in future cash expenditures or otherwise affect the ongoing business or financial performance of its services segment," said the company in a statement announcing a batch of organizational changes for enterprise services business. That's correct, but it's also baloney. It's the type of switcheroo companies lob at investors and shareholders after a transaction they thought was solid had gone bad. Here's how I see it, in HP's case. The company paid about $10.2 billion for Autonomy, representing "24 times Autonomy's trailing earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization," according to a News calculation. Before the Autonomy deal, HP had also made other good-deals-gone-bad, including its $1.2 billion purchase of Palm Inc. The transaction helped HP secure Palm's WebOS, but soon it discontinued the devices and took a "one-time charge" of about $1 billion in goodwill write-down. Previous acquisitions that helped to balloon HP's "goodwill" include the 2010 purchase of ArcSight Inc. and 3Par Inc., for $1.5 billion and $2.35 billion, respectively. The excess premiums paid for these companies are sitting like two tired elephants on HP's balance sheet, distorting its financial profile. And, while HP and companies in similar situations may claim goodwill charges are not cash transactions and don't hurt the enterprise on a long-term basis, they do represent actual monetary (or stock) outlays initially. A write-down, no matter how it is described, is an admission that resources were misused and demonstrates initial poor judgment on the part of the executives and board. All this has long-term implications for the enterprise. These events foster the creation of an environment of seeming ineptitude and lack of trust in company senior executives. For example, would I trust HP if it were to announce today another big purchase? Would I believe the management had done its due diligence? Do I think they seriously consider long-term fiduciary responsibility and are not pandering to their own whims? And would I be certain the board of directors isn't just hurling another dart at a board and hoping to hit the jackpot? Investors clearly think HP isn't a hot investment, and the reasons for this certainly include its acquisition history. HP's market value of $38 billion, as at the time of writing this article, is about half its 52-week high, which is 64 percent below the two-year peak and vastly less than the $227 billion market capitalization of IBM Corp. (NYSE: IBM), not to mention the even more stunning $592 billion for Apple Inc. (Nasdaq: AAPL). Look at their annual fiscal revenues, though, and the three companies seem more or less in the same range. Apple had $108.3 billion in fiscal 2001, IBM $107 billion for calendar 2011, and HP $127.3 billion for its fiscal 2011. Something is off-base here if the capitalizations are so much different. Of course, the companies' sales growth rates are also quite different, although HP's and IBM's are tracking similarly. But that's not the issue here. HP's financial position is weak (long-term debts as at the end of the April quarter were $26 billion versus $8.3 billion in cash and short-term investments), and it will get weaker if the company, under new CEO Meg Whitman, pursues wrongheaded acquisitions similar to the ones her three predecessors did. The wounds former CEOs Carly Fiorina, Mark Hurd, and Léo Apotheker inflicted on HP are deep and can't be written off.