曾经显赫一时的中美合资新创企业──凌讯科技(Legend Silicon)，在2011年底时结束了在美国的营运业务。其中究竟出了什么问题？我们又能从中学习到什么经验教训？
在 读过Raj Karamchedu所写的《The Disconnect Patterns: Notes for Managing a U.S.-China High Technology Company.》一书后，终于在上周有机会见到了作者本尊。我想当面问问他关于凌讯科技──这家他最后经营管理过的公司──究竟发生了什么事？我还想听 听Karamchedu谈谈他任职于这家中美合资企业的个人经验。针对这部份，我认为Karamchedu在他写的书中并未多谈。
我知道没人想在离开前任雇主后还过河拆桥。所以，我并不指望他能告诉我所有的来龙去脉。但我们的对话内容仍透露出一些可能导致凌讯科技结束美国营运业务的线索，以及任职于中、美合资企业中的任何人都应该知道的几件事。
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专注于开发数字电视芯片的凌讯科技曾经是美国加州Fremont一家知名的新创企业。这家公司具备了所有得天独厚的条件──包括由清华大学的留美学者(其中还包括一位清华大学教授)所创办、自主创新、与中国政府机构关系密切，以及拥有美式管理团队。
凌讯科技积极投入中国数字广播电视标准的开发，而且它看起来就像在天时地利人和的条件下崛起，特别当时中国正准备好迎接2008年北京奥运的来临──还有什么比这更好的时机以展现数字电视技术呢？
本文授权编译自EE Times，版权所有，谢绝转载
本文下一页：千万别低估了政治环境
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2007年春天，英特尔旗下投资公司Intel Captial斥资4,000万美元投资于凌讯科技。
时间快转来到2011年底，凌讯科技决定关闭美国加州总部，裁撤掉在美国的所有员工及其管理团队。凌讯仍保有在中国的子公司，并为现有的客户提供服务，但似乎从那时起就再也未开发新产品了。凌讯科技的公司官网也还同时存在中英双语版本，但自2011年起未见更新，原先页面上所列的公司管理团队也不复存在。
那么，凌讯究竟是哪里出错了？而曾经担任凌讯COO的Karamchedu又从中学到了哪些经验教训？
很自然地，Karamchedu分析了他所得到的经验教训。从这家中-美芯片公司的文化中，他惊讶地发现了一些事，也看到了团队所经历的挣扎，因此他特别强调以下五点：
一、千万别低估了政治环境
要正确的解读政治环境，可能会是个严峻的挑战──在中国和美国都一样。虽然许多读者常提醒我们保持中立，避免带有政治立场的文章，但如果不注意某些地区的政治角力(或完全搞不清楚当地谁因为什么原因宠幸谁)的话，其结果是相当可怕的。
在凌讯科技草创时期，中国 DTV 的转型比一般预期地更缓慢。再者，中国 DTV 基础架构转型时所需的成本，该由谁来买单呢？中国官方可能突如其来地要求你提供财务支持、支付必要的回扣或最后决定什么都不采用。简单来说，它缺少一种循序渐进的转型过程，当然也就没有一个公开的市场让凌讯科技这样的芯片商参与。相反地，凌讯发现自己正担负着一个国家DTV转型的重大任务。
本文授权编译自EE Times，版权所有，谢绝转载
本文下一页：中国人喜欢用更低的成本来实现“创新”
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• 美国把中国投资当作特洛伊木马？
• 想成为LTE市场王者，得看中国移动脸色行事
• 跟中国做生意，会担心自己的技术被偷走？3p1esmc
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二、新奇 vs 创新
即 使是在西方技术领域，过去被看重的“发明”现在已被简化成为“创新”，往往只需为系统简单地加入最新的技术与功能。而中国现在更将这一趋势发挥得淋漓尽致 ──他们喜欢让产品看来更“新奇”(无论是5寸屏幕的智能手机或四核心应用处理器的新趋势)，同时也快速地发展出一些新噱头。他们善长用更低的成本来实现 “既创新又新奇”。
这几乎就像中国人学会如何“破解”西方所取得的创新，而今他们正用自己的游戏规则打败了西方国家，Karamchedu解释。
三、定价策略
如果你的客户基础来自全球，包括美国、欧洲、日本与中国，那么定价就是中、美合资公司所面对最困难的挑战。
理论上，你不能让同一款芯片卖不一样的两种价格。但是，对于中国OEM/ODM显然就得采用不同的定价模式。对于美国芯片公司来说，虽然为大量芯片采购订单降价是很合理的事，但如果在中国大量采购的话，价格通常会被提高。同时，中国OEM/ODM几乎一开始就预期以极低价格取得新芯片。
如何居中调解这种差距仍然是一项巨大的挑战──成为想要根据一般原则定价的美国团队以及从当地客户看到不同需求的中国团队之间的一种拉据战。
本文授权编译自EE Times，版权所有，谢绝转载
本文下一页：别指望能从你的中国同事/客户得到回馈
相关阅读：
• 美国把中国投资当作特洛伊木马？
• 想成为LTE市场王者，得看中国移动脸色行事
• 跟中国做生意，会担心自己的技术被偷走？3p1esmc
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四、认定客户采用了你的芯片？
这 并不是特别针对中国OEM而已(我也听过韩国三星有类似情况)，但是，一般来说，你永远不会知道你的芯片(你认为已取得设计订单的芯片)是否真的被客户用 于其设计中。实际的情况通常是你得和好几家竞争厂商的团队共同为OEM/ODM工作。虽然你和许多潜在客户握了手，你也永远无法确定你的芯片最后是否会被用于其系统中。这种做法──从OEM的观点来说，可能是必要的──可能会让你被榨干好多资源，最后仍徒劳无功。
五、别指望能从你的中国同事/客户得到回馈
对于在一家中、美合资公司工作的人来说，最令人沮丧的一件事就是你很难从中国的同事或客户得到任何回馈。通常，中国客户根本不知道他们要什么或如何响应。或许更令人挫斥的是，你的中国客户或同事多半分享一些对于开发新市场的恐惧。他们宁可追逐于已经验证或明显已经成长中的市场。
因此，虽然他们可能悄悄地决定为下一款产品周期增添更多新奇的功能，他们也不太会和你交流或分享他们的想法。最后，你只会陷于难以理解的谜团中。
本文授权编译自EE Times，版权所有，谢绝转载
编译：Susan Hong
参考英文原文：Yoshida in China: Guidelines for working at U.S.-Sino firm，by Junko Yoshida
相关阅读：
• 美国把中国投资当作特洛伊木马？
• 想成为LTE市场王者，得看中国移动脸色行事
• 跟中国做生意，会担心自己的技术被偷走？3p1esmc
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Yoshida in China: Guidelines for working at U.S.-Sino firm
Junko Yoshida
Legend Silicon, once a red-hot China-U.S. startup focused on DTV chips, closed its U.S. operation in late 2011. What went wrong and what did we learn? MOUNTAIN VIEW, Calif. – Last week I had a chance to sit down with Raj Karamchedu, author of a book entitled, "The Disconnect Patterns: Notes for Managing a U.S.-China High Technology Company."
After reviewing the book earlier this month, I was eager for a face-to-face meeting with the author--for two reasons. First, I wanted to learn more about whatever happened to Legend Silicon (Karamchedu’s last employer). Second, I wanted to hear more about Karamchedu’s personal experience working at Legend Silicon. My thinking was that Karamchedu left a lot unsaid in his book.
I understood that nobody wants to burn bridges with a former employer. So, I didn’t exactly expect a tell-all story. But our conversation revealed a few clues about what might have led to the closure of Legend Silicon in the United States, and subsequently a few things anyone working in a China-U.S. company ought to know.
Legend Silicon, focused on digital TV chips, was once a red-hot start-up based in Fremont, Calif. It appeared to have come up with all the right ingredients--including the Tsinghua University pedigree (even a Tsinghua professor) of its founders, along with on-the-ground intelligence, procedural knowledge and close ties with Chinese government agencies, and a U.S. management team.
Legend Silicon, deeply involved in the development of digital TV standards in China, also looked like it was emerging at the right time in the right place, since China was getting ready for the Beijing Olympics in 2008. What better timing could anyone ask for showcasing digital TV technology?
In spring 2007, Intel Capital, the investment arm of chipmaker Intel Corp., led a series D private equity investment round worth up to $40 million in Legend Silicon.
Legend Silicon's booth at CCBN (China Content Broadcasting Network) exhibition in 2011.
Fast forward to the end of 2011, Legend Silicon decided to close its U.S. headquarters, with its U.S. management team laying off everyone in the U.S. including themselves. Legend Silicon’s Chinese subsidiary still exists to serve existing customers, but there appears to be no new product development going on. Legend Silicon’s website still exists both in English and Chinese, but the page that lists its management team is no longer available.
So where did Legend Silicon go wrong, and what lessons did Karamchedu learn from having been COO?
Lessons to be learned
Naturally, Karamchedu has analyzed the lessons he learned, reducing his insights to the comprehensive list of “disconnects” laid out in his book.
But during the interview, he highlighted the following five points--as something that either caught him by surprise, or what he saw his team struggling with at the U.S.-China chip company.
1. Never underestimate the political environment
To read the political environment correctly is a serious challenge--both in China and the United States. While many EE Times readers often advise us to keep politics out of stories, the consequences of not knowing how politics works in a certain region (or being clueless about who is favoring whom in that region due to which reasons) are dire.
At the time of Legend Silicon’s startup, the transition to DTV in China was moving more slowly than anyone had expected (despite the Olympics).
Moreover, who was going to pay the transition cost--necessary to make changes in China’s broadcasting infrastructure--remained in question. Chinese officials might unexpectedly ask for financial assistance, expect kickbacks or decide to do nothing. Simply put, there was no orderly transition process in place, and there was, hence, no conventional open market ready for chip vendors like Legend Silicon to jump in. Instead, the small new company found itself doing the heavy lifting needed for a nation’s DTV transition.
2. Novelty vs. innovation
Even in the Western technology field, what used to be considered “invention” is now reduced to “innovation,” which often amounts to the simple addition of new bells and whistles to systems. China is now taking that trend to another level. They love grabbing onto “novelty” (whether it is a new trend for 5-inch screen smartphones or quad-core apps processors) and developing those gimmicks quickly. They know how to add “innovation-cum-novelties” at low cost.
It’s almost as though the Chinese have learned how to “blast” gimmick innovations made by the West and they’re now beating the Western companies at their own game, explained Karamchedu.
3. Pricing
If your customer-base is truly global--including those in the U.S., Europe, Japan and China, pricing becomes one of the hardest issues with which your China-U.S. company must wrestle.
In theory, you can’t have two separate prices for the same chip, and yet, Chinese OEMs/ODMs are clearly in need of a different pricing model than what’s applied in the West. While it’s customary for a U.S. chip company to reduce the price for chips purchased in volume, the price often goes up in China if you buy in volume. Meanwhile, Chinese OEMs/ODMs almost expect to get their hands on a new chip at a very low cost--initially.
How you mediate that gap remains a huge challenge-- turning into a tug of war between a U.S. team who wants to decide price according to a set of familiar rules and a China team that sees a whole different demand from its local customers.
4. Knowing if your chip is actually getting designed in
This isn’t particularly specific to Chinese OEMs (I've heard similar stories about Korean giants like Samsung), but, generally speaking, you’re never sure if your chip (which you thought was a design win) is actually designed into a system by your customers. More often than not, you’re working for OEMs/ODMs along with a number of other competing teams from your rival chip companies. Despite a lot of handholding with your potential customer, you’re never sure your chip will eventually get designed into their systems. This practice--maybe necessary from an OEM viewpoint--could suck up a lot of your resources with no results after all.
5. Expect no feedback from your China customers/colleagues
One of the most frustrating things for anyone working for a U.S.-China company is that you rarely get any feedback from your China colleagues or customers. Often, Chinese customers just don’t know what they want. Perhaps more striking is that your customers or colleagues often share a fear of creating a new market. They’d rather go after a market that’s already proven or that’s getting visibly hot.
So, while they might quietly decide to hang their hat on novelty features to the next product cycle, they neglect to communicate their decisions or share their desires with you. You end up with an enigma designed into a conundrum.
Related stories:
China chips: Bomb, or just a lot of firecrackers?
Yoshida in China: Managing Sino-U.S. disconnects
Yoshida in China: Chip guy's quest for end of the rainbow
责编：Quentin
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