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瑞萨放弃无线Modem的理由:1个不够,给你5个!

景况不佳的瑞萨电子已在6月底正式宣布,将终止其无线调制解调器芯片业务。瑞萨是在2010年收购了诺基亚的无线调制解调器开发团队,当初宣布收购时,产业界就质疑过瑞萨想由一家芯片供应商转型为全球移动通信技术领导者的野心;而经历了三年的挣扎…

景况不佳的日本芯片供应商瑞萨电子(Renesas Electronics)已在6月底正式宣布,将终止其无线调制解调器芯片业务(即目前由 Renesas Mobile 管辖的业务)。 瑞萨是在2010年收购了诺基亚(Nokia)的无线调制解调器开发团队,上述决定将让该团队的全体人员受到影响,包括分别在芬兰、印度与中国的1,100、 300与30名员工。当初宣布收购诺基亚调制解调器业务时,产业界就质疑过瑞萨想由一家芯片供应商转型为全球移动通信技术领导者的野心;而经历了三年的挣扎, 那个不可能实现的梦想果然还是破灭了…

《国际电子商情》瑞萨官网上对终止的无线调制解调器业务范围作出了解释
瑞萨官网上对终止的无线调制解调器业务范围作出了解释
Source:RenesasJzEesmc

所以,到底是为什么会这样? 第一, 全球手机市场规则自2010年以来出现大幅度的变化,少数几家智能手机厂商(例如Apple、Samsung),以及相关芯片供应商(如Samsung、 Qualcomm)成了大权在握的赢家。如果你没在 iPhone 或 Galaxy 里面抢到一席之地,你会发现你的手机芯片──特别是那些位高阶智能手机设计的──根本没其它地方可用。 显然,打造一家以系出名门(如Ericsson、Nokia)之先进蜂窝式通信技术为基础的公司,并不足以赢得全球市场战争;无论是 Renesas Mobile 或是 ST-Ericsson (已经在今年稍早前走入历史),最后都无法在过去两年的剧烈市场动荡中存活。 本文授权编译自EE Times,版权所有,谢绝转载 第2页:没有针对中国市场的策略,低估了需要的人力 第3页:管理一个全球化团队太过困难

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每日一报7月1日:诺基亚26亿美元收购西门子手中诺西股份
日三大半导体厂商获利回升,加强核心事业
手机芯片淘汰风波未平,后退出者更受伤JzEesmc

{pagination} 第二, 无论是ST-Ericsson或是Renesas Mobile都没有可靠的中国市场策略;这两家公司远远落后聚焦于蓬勃发展之低价智能手机市场的亚洲同业们,包括台湾的联发科(MediaTek)、中国的展讯(Spreadtrum)以及不断冒出头的中国本土芯片设计业者。 不管是Renesas Mobile或ST-Ericsson,都没有能因应中国OEM/ODM客户需求的正确产品阵容或开发策略。

《国际电子商情》相比瑞萨在华的MCU等业务,手机Modem确实不被重视
相比瑞萨在华的MCU等业务,手机Modem确实不被重视
JzEesmc

第三, 低估了开发蜂窝式调制解调器芯片所需的人力;开发调制解调器芯片需要精通技术知识与经验的工程师,并需要保持对持续变动中蜂窝式通信标准的了解。而不同于数字化的应用处理器,这类调制解调器芯片就算设计出来也可能最后无法完成,因为还必须通过漫长的认证程序。 调制解调器芯片需要经过各家电信营运商的现场测试、修改以及认证,然后还要一再进行调整;一家调制解调器芯片设计业者拥有超过1,000名工程师的情况并不罕见。 第四, 上述的庞大人力非常消耗公司资源,如果没有赢到大单,就难以维持经营。无论是ST-Ericsson 或Renesas Mobile都已经寻找买主好一阵子,但最后却乏人问津。在本质上,它们追随着德州仪器(TI)、飞思卡尔(Freescale)与美商亚德诺(ADI) 的脚步,都结束了调制解调器芯片业务;不过ADI算是个例外,该公司的调制解调器芯片业务是被联发科收归旗下。 本文授权编译自EE Times,版权所有,谢绝转载 第3页:管理一个全球化团队太过困难

相关阅读:
每日一报7月1日:诺基亚26亿美元收购西门子手中诺西股份
日三大半导体厂商获利回升,加强核心事业
手机芯片淘汰风波未平,后退出者更受伤JzEesmc

{pagination} 第五, Renesas Mobile与ST-Ericsson 都面临整并的梦靥。Strategy Analytics 分析师Sravan Kundojjala 在3月时发表评论指出,ST-Ericsson的问题在于:“把旧有产品复制过渡到一个新产品蓝图,以及管理高层不断变动。”他表示,这家合资公司在整并 多家公司与执行原始计划上面临困境。 瑞萨的情况也很类似,该公司原本就是一个与NEC芯片部门合并、组织复杂且拥肿的企业,后来其手机芯片子公司Renesas Mobile又加入了超过1,100位芬兰工程师。 为了达到全球化效应,瑞萨将Renesas Mobile的关键决策功能──包括芯片订价、产品蓝图以及LTE调制解调器芯片开发──转移到Renesas Mobile位于巴黎的欧洲总部,虽然这能避免日本文化的羞怯问题,但管理一个全球化团队被证实是太过困难、甚至可说是大胆。 根据母公司瑞萨的官方消息,该公司将“停止LTE调制解调器芯片的开发与销售”,但Renesas Mobile所开发的IP (包括LTE调制解调器)将如何处置、或是否将授权给其它公司,目前仍不清楚。 此 外属于瑞萨百分之百全资子公司的Renesas Mobile,以及旗下的Renesas Mobile Europe、Rensas Mobile India与Renesas Tongxinjishu,未来是否将不复存在,也还是未知数。至截稿时间为止,Renesas Mobile的一位高层对EETimes美国版表示无法透露相关讯息。 本文授权编译自EE Times,版权所有,谢绝转载 编译:Judith Cheng 参考英文原文:5 Reasons Renesas Ditched Modem Business,by Junko Yoshida

相关阅读:
每日一报7月1日:诺基亚26亿美元收购西门子手中诺西股份
日三大半导体厂商获利回升,加强核心事业
手机芯片淘汰风波未平,后退出者更受伤JzEesmc

{pagination} 5 Reasons Renesas Ditched Modem Business Junko Yoshida MADISON, Wis. — Ailing Japanese chip vendor Renesas Electronics Corp. officially announced Thursday, June 27, what appeared inevitable to the rest of the world: termination of its wireless modem business. Renesas acquired in 2010 a wireless modem development team from Nokia, all of whom will be affected: 1,100 employees in Finland, 300 in India, and 30 in China. The acquisition of Nokia's modem business, when announced, met with skepticism from the industry while revealing Renesas's ambition to transform from a chip supplier to the world's mobile technology leader. That impossible dream, however, went belly-up after a three-year struggle. So, what exactly happened? First, the world order in the mobile market, since 2010, has dramatically shifted, leaving power with a handful of smartphone winners (namely, Apple and Samsung) and mobile chip suppliers (Qualcomm, Samsung). If you are not in iPhone or Galaxy by now, you've found that your mobile chips -- especially those designed for advanced smartphones -- have nowhere to go. Clearly, building a company based on advanced cellular technologies of well known pedigree (such as those of Ericsson or of Nokia) wasn't enough to win the global battle. Neither Renesas Mobile Corp. (RMC) nor the ST-Ericsson joint venture (which broke up earlier this year) was able to survive the violently turbulent market of the last two years. Second, neither ST-Ericsson nor Renesas Mobile had a credible China strategy. Both companies lagged far behind their peers in Asia, including Taiwan's MediaTek, China's Spreadtrum, and a growing number of China's indigenous fabless chip vendors, all focused on the now burgeoning low-cost smartphone market in Asia. Neither RMC nor ST-Ericsson had the right product portfolio or development strategy to meet the needs of OEMs and ODMs in China. Third, let's not underestimate the workforce needed to develop cellular modems. The development of modem chips requires engineers with the sort of intimate knowledge and experience that enables them to keep up with constantly changing cellular standards. More significantly, unlike digital apps processors, the work on those cellular modem chips is often never done, even long after the modems are designed, due to a long certification process they must go through. Modem chips need to be field-tested, modified, and approved by cellular operators. And then they get adjusted again. It's not unusual for modem chip developers to keep more than a thousand engineers. Bloated Workforce Fourth, this bloated workforce tends to drain a company's resources. It's impossible to maintain, without big design wins. Both ST-Ericsson and RMC had been in search of buyers for months, but, in the end, they found no takers. In essence, they followed the path traveled by Texas Instruments, Freescale, and Analog Devices years ago, when they all ended up fleeing the modem business altogether. Analog Devices was an exception, but only because the company's modem group was absorbed by MediaTek. Fifth, both Renesas and ST-Ericsson suffered from a consolidation nightmare. As Strategy Analytics analyst Sravan Kundojjala commented in March, ST-Ericsson struggled with "duplication among legacy products, transition to a new product roadmap and constant management changes." The analyst said at that time the JV struggled to integrate multiple companies and execute its original plan. Similarly, Renesas, already a complex (and bloated) entity merged with NEC's chip division, had to bring more than 1,100 Finnish engineers into its 100 percent mobile chip subsidiary, RMC. In an effort to globalize, Renesas moved RMC's key decision-making functions -- pricing of chips, development of product roadmaps, and LTE modems -- to RMC-Paris. Despite avoiding the trap of Japanese timidity, managing a global team proved to be too difficult even for the bold. The parent Renesas announced that the company will "stop developing activities and sales expansion of the LTE Modem." What remains unclear is where any RMC-developed IP -- including LTE modems -- will go, and if they'll be available for licensing to other companies. We also do not know whether RMC, as a wholly owned Renesas subsidiary, will also cease to exist, along with Renesas Mobile Europe Oy, Rensas Mobile India, and Renesas Tongxinjishu (Beijing) Co. Ltd. An executive at RMC, when reached by EE Times today, said he's not allowed to explain.
责编:Quentin
本文为国际电子商情原创文章,未经授权禁止转载。请尊重知识产权,违者本司保留追究责任的权利。
Junko Yoshida
ASPENCORE全球联席总编辑,首席国际特派记者。曾任把口记者(beat reporter)和EE Times主编的Junko Yoshida现在把更多时间用来报道全球电子行业,尤其关注中国。 她的关注重点一直是新兴技术和商业模式,新一代消费电子产品往往诞生于此。 她现在正在增加对中国半导体制造商的报道,撰写关于晶圆厂和无晶圆厂制造商的规划。 此外,她还为EE Times的Designlines栏目提供汽车、物联网和无线/网络服务相关内容。 自1990年以来,她一直在为EE Times提供内容。
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