三星会不会步诺基亚的后尘？

三星电子(Samsung Electronics)日前公布该公司 2013年第四季财报，当季营业利润为8.31兆韩元(约77亿美元)，比分析师先前所预期的少了20%左右；该公司当季营业利润是近两年来第一次出现萎缩，较上一季的94亿美元减少了18%。 虽 然三星的财报也显示其 2013年第四季营收达到创纪录的549.5亿美元，产业界仍关注于该公司表示在未来的几季可能成长动力有限的状况，此外三星也针对目前这一季恐面临“营收乏力”发出警告，主要原因是IT产业在每年的年初进入淡季；该公司虽预期业绩表现将在下半年好转，但这在坏消息之后显得不算是好消息。 应该没有人预测过三星的“结局”，但现在可能是个可以拿它跟2007年的诺基亚(Nokia)比较的好时机。目前手机部门对三星电子营收与利润的贡献度超过五成，而该公司在全球智能手机市场的占有率超过35%，诺基亚的全球市占率在2007年第三季达到39%的高峰。

诺基亚2006~2011年营收变化
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现今市场分析师对诺基亚业绩走下坡的普遍看法，是该公司错失智能手机风潮、把功能型手机抓在手里太久。但有趣的是，回顾历史，当时分析师对于诺基亚在北美与南美市场缺乏存在感并不太关注，他们认为诺基亚能掌握非美国市场对于功能型手机不断成长的需求。 在2007年那时候，分析师甚至谈到诺基亚为印度、中国等市场生产廉价手机并获利的能力，而那：“让该公司得以拉大与竞争对手之间的差距，包括摩托罗拉(Motorola)、三星与Sony Ericsson，这三家厂商的市占率总和才与诺基亚差不多。” 显然，并不是只有诺基亚没看到智能手机浪潮即将来袭──至少在2007年那时候，连市场分析师也没注意到。此外，他们也低估了中国手机业者与白牌供货商的 能力，这些厂商能以更低的成本、更快的速度(这更重要)制造一系列的手机，使得诺基亚在全球市场的战争中成为最大的输家。 这个产业界的每个投资人、分析师以及媒体记者都在猜测下一件大事，而若是能预知在目前的智能手机风潮之后将会发生什么，应该能有助于预测三星的未来。不过无论是物联网(IoT)或是可穿戴式装置在目前都仍在一片浑沌，没有人敢打包票它们会不会崛起。 比较今日的三星以及2007年的诺基亚，其中有一个分析关键是软件；试问有哪家以硬件制造起家的公司，能在今日调整自己成为一家更偏向以软件为导向的硬件企业？诺基亚的败笔不只在智能手机或是中国市场，而是在于无法顺利将手机硬件为导向的业务转型，也未真正理解朝向软件密集发展的未来趋势。 请注意，诺基亚是完全有意识到软件趋势，而且也投资了不少软件公司与技术，包括Symbian、Meego与Navteq；但最后，诺基亚累积的软件资产越 多，焦点也越来越模糊。诺基亚已在 2013年宣布，将在2016年终止对Symbian与Meego应用程序的支持。 三星到目前为止也只是在口头上强调拥有软件能力的重要性，号称该公司的6万5,000名研发工程师中，有3万5,000人是软件工程师；但你能举得出过去五年来三星曾做过的出色软件投资吗？或是举出一款因为软件功能而取得显著差异化的三星产品？ 不要问我答案，我想不出来！ 本文授权编译自EE Times，版权所有，谢绝转载 编译：Judith Cheng 参考英文原文：Is Nokia’s 2007 Decline a Lesson for Samsung Today?，by Junko Yoshida

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{pagination} Is Nokia’s 2007 Decline a Lesson for Samsung Today? Junko Yoshida MADISON, Wis. — In the results posted Friday for the fourth quarter of 2013, Samsung Electronics reported an operating profit of 8.31 trillion won ($7.7 billion), which missed analyst expectations by a whopping 20%. Samsung also reported its first quarterly operating profit decline in two years -- an 18% drop from the $9.4 billion it reported for the third quarter. Though it posted a record $54.95 billion of revenue, the industry is focused now on its potential growth limits in the coming quarters. The Korean company also issued a warning about anemic earnings in the current quarter. It's blaming "weak seasonality" in the IT industry early in a calendar year. It expects performance to pick up in the second half, but admitting a disappointment in advance is hardly good news. Nobody is predicting the beginning of the end for Samsung, but this might be an opportune moment to compare its situation today with Nokia's back in 2007. Today the mobile division is responsible for more than half of Samsung Electronics' revenue and profit. Further, Samsung's share of the global smartphone market is more than 35%, and Nokia's share peaked at 39% in the third quarter of 2007. Today, the prevailing analysis of Nokia's downfall says the Finnish mobile company didn't see the emerging smartphone trend, causing it to hang on to feature phones too long. It's interesting to look back on the history, though. Back then, analysts were less concerned about Nokia's lack of presence in the North and South American markets. They were betting on its feature phones to capture the rising demand from non-US markets. Analysts even talked about Nokia's ability to manufacture inexpensive cellphones in China and India profitably. They told The New York Times in 2007 that it would "help the company build on its already sizable lead over its challengers -- Motorola, Samsung and Sony Ericsson -- whose combined market share barely equals that of Nokia." Obviously, it wasn't just Nokia that didn't see the smartphone tsunami coming -- at least in 2007. Analysts missed it, too. Moreover, they underestimated the power of China's OEMs and whitebox vendors. Their ability to churn out a host of mobile phones at a much lower cost and (more importantly) much faster turned Nokia into the biggest loser in the global feature battle. Every investor, every analyst, and every reporter is in the business of hunting for the next big thing. Knowing what will come after the current smartphone boom should help predict Samsung's future. Though the Internet of Things and wearable devices are the buzz of the moment, the jury is still out on both categories. Drawing a parallel between Samsung today and Nokia in 2007, the key to the analysis is software. Can any company launched as a hardware manufacturer adjust to today's more software-driven hardware business? Nokia's Waterloo wasn't just smartphones or China. It was an inability to transform its mobile hardware-oriented handset business and develop a real understanding of the software-intensive future. Remember that Nokia was fully aware of the software trend. It invested in a host of software companies and technologies, including Symbian, Meego, and Navteq. But in the end, the more software assets Nokia amassed, the less focused it became. Last year, it announced that it would drop support for Symbian and Meego applications, despite having pledged its troth until 2016. Samsung also pays lip service today to the importance of becoming a leading player in software. It says that 35,000 of its 65,000 R&D staff members are working on software. But name one stellar software investment Samsung has made in the last five years. Name one Samsung product whose performance is significantly differentiated by its software. But don't ask me. I'm stumped.