夏普的张良计Vs富士康的过墙梯

今年三月，当夏普(Sharp)宣布将与全球最大的全约制造商鸿海(富士康, Foxconn)缔结伙伴关系时，这家日本领先的LCD制造商便招来了一些仍相信日本握有强大制造实力和高科技优势人们的大量批评声浪。批评内容主要是认为夏普和鸿海的协议是一种彻底的背叛──将灵魂出卖给台湾企业。 但也有人称赞夏普的勇气。我正好是其中之一。 这份协议意味着，夏普这家历史悠久的日本制造商已经吞下了它的骄傲，竭力跟上全球电子制造市场的新标准。为了生存，夏普要找到新的道路。在我看来，夏普是首批意识到现实环境已然改变的企业之一。 时间快转到2012年8月。 该协议于三月披露，在此之前，夏普和鸿海已经进行了一年的谈判，但至今仍未落幕。截至目前，夏普还没从鸿海那里拿到一分钱。 过去10天内，我们看到两家公司不断争吵，鸿海说，该公司毋须兑现3月27日的协议，即以每股550日圆收购夏普10%，而夏普则坚持三月的协议仍然有效。 这项最初被视为台日历史性合作的协议，现在已经变成电子产业中无法落幕的一出戏了。 夏普和鸿海之间的最新裂痕，说明了一个这两家亚洲企业都缺乏基本沟通技巧。但更令人不安的，似乎是缺乏纪律和对彼此的相互尊重。 夏普目前正处于“重大损害控制模式”之下，也就是说，该公司正在“进行各种谈判，使其与鸿海在三月签署的协议生效。”虽然两家公司目前都说这笔交易正重新谈判(鸿海表示本月底将公开修订后的协议)，但新协议的结构依然不甚明朗。 这当中究竟出了什么问题？ 在检讨了两家公司犯了什么错以前，让我们先回顾一下他们在三月公布的初步协议。 夏普和鸿海同意，鸿海取得夏普9.9%股份，而这家台湾公司创办人郭台铭则自行出资，投入夏普Sakai厂──获得46.5%股份。Sakai厂于2009年激活，可处理超大玻璃基板，被视为液晶面板生产的重要里程碑，但这座工厂由于运作速率过低，因而一直面临危机。 目前两家公司之间的分歧点，在于夏普的股 票价格急剧下滑。 今年3月27日，鸿海同意支付每股550日圆，在2013年3月底前收购夏普的9.9%股份。但这家日本公司的股 票已经下跌至双方商议价格的三分之一左右。 据报导，鸿海董事长郭台铭说他并关心夏普股 票价格的短期亏损。但在8月3日时，他却突然宣布，两家公司同意检讨收购价格。夏普则迅速否认同意重新谈判，从而暴露出双方的裂痕。 两家公司目前必须做的事 上周，台湾经济部宣布审查所有投资，退回鸿海收购夏普10%股份的申请，认为这项交易的投资报酬率“不够合理”。 台湾经济部投资审议委员会副执行秘书张铭斌表示，这不代表这项交易被拒绝。投资审议委员会已要求鸿海提出更多与预期投资回报相关的信息。 夏普正处于不利情况，势必得重新与鸿海谈判。 8月2日，夏普宣布该公司在这个会计年度净亏损2,500亿日圆，股价应声下跌28%，当日以192日圆作收，比当初协议的每股550日圆收购价还低65%。 夏普也面临着减少有息债务的压力，截至六月底，其债务激增到约1.25兆日圆。另外，夏普预计赎回债券预计也会造成该公司财务吃紧。 虽然两家公司还未做出最终协议，但我建议双方都先平静下来，以推动两家公司发展为前提来进行讨论。 台日联手抗韩？ 鸿海郭台铭的野心已经不是秘密了：为富士康打造能超越韩国巨擘三星电子的技术实力，这确实不是什么秘密。但这家台湾电子业大厂需要夏普。 对夏普来说，鸿海能让该公司再拓展市场。若夏普确实愿意进一步将小型至中型LCD面板技术转移到鸿海目前建设中的中国工厂，那么，在这项合作案中，鸿海所花的每一份钱都是值得的。但若鸿海的真正动机是并吞夏普，仅将其纳为子公司，则不仅夏普大失颜面，鸿海也会失去夏普的信任。 对鸿海来说，这可能是最后一局。但若夏普无法接受最终协议，这家日本公司或许会开始寻找其它投资者。无论如何，这项协议都已接近尾声了。 本文授权编译自EE Times，版权所有，谢绝转载 编译： Joy Teng 参考英文原文：Foxconn outfoxes Sharp’s sharpest ，by Junko Yoshida

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{pagination} Foxconn outfoxes Sharp’s sharpest Junko Yoshida When Sharp announced in March its partnership with Hon Hai,the decision generated a torrent of criticism. Since then, things have gone horribly wrong. MADISON, Wisc. -- When Sharp Corp. announced in March its partnership with Hon Hai (also known as Foxconn), the world’s largest contract manufacturer, the decision by Japan’s leading LCD maker generated a torrent of criticism among those who still want to believe in Japan’s manufacturing prowess and high-tech superiority. Critics characterized the Sharp-Hon Hai agreement as outright betrayal; Japan was selling its soul to Taiwan. But others praised Sharp for its boldness. I happen to be one of them. The deal meant that Sharp had swallowed its pride as one of Japan’s old-line manufacturers, and is now committed to the new normal in the global electronics manufacturing market. It wants to find a new path to survival. I view Sharp as one of the first Japanese companies to have awakened to new realities. Fast forward to August, 2012. The deal unveiled in March – which Sharp and Hon Hai had already been negotiating for much of the previous year – is nowhere close to closure. So far, Sharp hasn’t seen a dime from Hon Hai. Instead, over the last 10 days, we’ve been witnessing daily spats between the two companies, with Hon Hai saying that the company didn't need to honor a March 27 agreement to acquire 10% of Sharp at 550 yen per share, while Sharp insisted that the March agreement was still valid. Originally billed as an historic collaboration between Taiwan and Japan, the agreement has turned into the sort of public theater that nobody in the electronics industry has seen for a long The latest rift between Sharp and Hon Hai illustrates a disturbing lack of basic communication skills between two Asian companies. But more disconcerting is what seems like the lack of discipline and mutual respect between them. Sharp, now in major damage-control mode, is saying that the company is "proceeding with various talks to make effective the agreement on a tie-up we signed with Hon Hai in March." While both companies now say that the deal is being re-negotiated (Hon Hai says that the revised deal will be announced at the end of this month), the structure of the new agreement remains far from clear. What has gone wrong? But before examining what went wrong between the two companies, let’s recap the initial deal announced by the two companies in March. Sharp and Hon Hai agreed to Hon Hai’s taking a 9.9 percent stake in Sharp, while the Taiwanese firm's billionaire founder Terry Gou invested his own money into Sharp’s Sakai fab – gaining a 46.5 percent share. The Sakai fab – opened in 2009, capable of handling super-large glass substrates – is considered an important milestone in LCD panel production but it has been struggling with a disappointingly low run rate. Central to the current disagreement between the two companies is a dramatic slide in Sharp’s stock price. Hon Hai agreed on March 27 to pay 550 yen per share to acquire a 9.9% stake in Sharp by the end of March 2013. But the Japanese manufacturer's stock later fell to about one-third of the price that the two sides had agreed on. Hon Hai Chairman Gou reportedly took this revolting development in stride at first, saying he didn't care about short-term losses in Sharp's stock price. But on Aug. 3, he suddenly announced that the two companies had agreed to review the purchase price. Sharp quickly denied agreeing to renegotiate, thus exposing the rift and revealing the shaky ground on which the original agreement now stands. What the two companies must do now To fuel its uncertainty, last Thursday (Aug. 9th), Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs, which reviews all outgoing investments, announced that it returned Hon Hai’s application for a regulatory review of its planned purchase of a 10% stake in Sharp on the grounds that the expected investment return on the deal "isn't reasonable enough." Emile Chang, deputy executive secretary of Taiwan's Investment Commission, reportedly said the Ministry’s move doesn't mean the deal has been rejected. The Investment Commission has asked Hon Hai to submit more information regarding the expected investment returns. Sharp currently couldn’t be in a much worse position to re-negotiate the deal with Hon Hai. On Aug. 2nd, Sharp announced that the company is expecting a net loss of 250 billion yen in the current fiscal year, prompting a 28 percent drop in share price, to close at 192 yen, 65 percent below the 550 yen-per-share Foxconn agreed to pay for the stake. Sharp is also under pressure to slash interest-bearing debt, which ballooned to about 1.25 trillion yen as of the end of June. The scheduled redemption of Sharp's corporate bonds is also expected to put a strain on the company's financing. While the two companies scramble to salvage the deal, I suggest both parties take a deep breath and agree on the basic principle that drove the two companies to talk in the first place. Taiwan/Japan vs. Korea? It’s no secret that Hon Hai’s Gou has harbored a naked ambition: build technology prowess at Foxconn that surpasses Korean giant Samsung Electronics. For that, the Taiwan giant needs Sharp. For Sharp, Hon Hai will free it to spread its wings beyond the domestic market. If Sharp indeed is willing to transfer the company’s advanced, small-to-medium LCD panel technology to a Hon Hai fab in China, currently under construction, the partnership with Sharp should be worth every penny to the Taiwn EMS giant. But if Hon Hai’s true motive is to gobble up Sharp and run it as its subsidiary, Hon Hai is not only losing Sharp’s face but also losing the company’s trust. This might be the end game for Hon Hai, after all. But if Sharp is really uncomfortable with this alliance, maybe it’s time for the Japanese company to start looking for another investor. Either way, this deal is clearly running out of time.