日本政府不喜欢国内企业拥有来自海外的所有权人或是资本投资，在过去几个月来，这种偏恶以“国家利益”为幌子，变得越来越明显。这种情况是令人担忧的…
不久前笔者人在东京，当地传言私募股权业者KKR有意收购日本芯片厂商瑞萨电子(Renesas)；而KKR一开始的目标是日立(Hitachi)，该公司打算把日立分拆成数个规模较小、但有利润的公司，并藉此获得丰厚投资报酬。
然而，一位资深日本产业观察家、技术顾问对此表示：“日立在日本是‘天皇级’公司，没人敢碰；”所以KKR才把投资标的转向了最近状况不佳的瑞萨。不过 KKR收购瑞萨的低飞球策略也遭遇失败，原因是日本政府很快地与10家本土企业(大多数是瑞萨的客户)联手筹措了一笔资金，出价2,000亿日圆 (25.5亿美元)收购瑞萨。
瑞萨这家日本微控制器大厂问题多多，其中关键之一就是其缓慢的决策程序，明显得归咎于该公司的管 理高层；这个问题又因为瑞萨的众多股东包括日立、NEC与三菱电机(Mitsubishi Electric)而变本加厉，这些股东在过去两年间都要在瑞萨的每个决策中保有发言权。
日本政府的援助计划是为瑞萨安插更多大股东，例如该公司客户之一、车厂丰田(Toyota)；但这恐怕只是让瑞萨的问题雪上加霜。
更重要的一个问题是，是否应该让瑞萨的客户成为其大股东？包括丰田等车厂，都倾向于藉由与芯片厂商协商价格来宣示其影响力，这意味着至少有一家大客户会与瑞萨需要将利润瑞大化的目标产生直接冲突。
瑞萨只是日本偏恶海外资金的一个最新案例；今年稍早，另一家日本科技厂商Olympus也在寻求金援，根据来自金融圈的消息来源指出，在后来Sony决定对 其注资之前，原本有两家外商有意投资，是三星(Samsung)与美商GE (General Electric)；这样的投资合作案其实是有理的，因为这两家外商都有Olympus所聚焦的医疗电子市场经验与地位。
但是，当上述投资案送到日本经济产业省(METI)，却被官员们驳回；根据消息来源指出，有一位官员告诉投资银行：“如果你们是来问有关于Olympus的海外所有权人问题，答案是“不行”，我们不想听到有外商公司对Olympus感兴趣。”
于是，不同于三星与GE，在医疗设备领域并不擅长的Sony后来在9月宣布对Olympus注资500亿日圆(6.42亿美元)，也成为拥有该公司10%股权的最大股东。
有部分日本产业界人士认为，主导以上交易的经济产业省官员是为了拯救Sony；毕竟这家日本消费性电子大厂也正处于水深火热中，很需要在其传统电视机、摄影机业务之外加入新的营收来源。透过投资Olympus，Sony得以立即将其触角伸进医疗内视镜(endoscope)领域。
日本政府干预的第三个案例，是先前在产业界沸沸扬扬的“鸿夏恋”；传言经济产业省正打算以日本企业拯救瑞萨的模式，来挽救面板厂夏普(Sharp)，总之其目标就是要阻止台湾厂商鸿海控制夏普的股权与技术。目前还不清楚事件将会如何发展，但日本政府显然正试图避免台湾EMS大厂并吞夏普。
为了保有人民的工作机会，并以经济安全为名义避免让日本技术流往海外，这在1970与1980年代是值得赞赏的；但来到2012年，这几乎等同于自我毁灭。
本文授权编译自EE Times，版权所有，谢绝转载
本文下一页：三大消费性电子厂各有各的问题
相关阅读：
• 裁员潮：AMD砍掉15%，Sony裁减2000人
• 旧貌换新颜，亚洲半导体市场之嬗变
• [图文报道] 在日本CEATEC上畅想智能连接的未来Wpbesmc
{pagination}
许多海外观察家都不解，为何日本认为自己有充裕的时间能解决那些日益严重的问题？更大的谜团是：为何日本人似乎认为，只要其本国厂商就可以解决那些经济与技术问题？其实，日本就像是搁浅在海上的船只，向邻近海域的其它船舰发送求救信号一点也不丢脸──就算它们挂着外国的旗帜。
三大消费性电子厂各有各的问题
索尼(Sony)、松下(Panasonic)与夏普(Sharp)这三家日本消费性电子大厂在不久前公布惨淡的第二季财报后，纷纷提出振兴策略；他们争相想要回答的两个问题是：最坏的情况已经过去了吗？以及什么将会是驱动他们未来成长的动力？
这些日本消费性电子厂商已经明确表示，他们希望尽快摆脱亏损的电视机业务，同时将把市场焦点由消费性电子产品转向“节能(eco)”、“智能(smart)”产品的开发，但相关细节仍然不完整，而且大部分缺乏说服力。
因此现在金融圈对这几家日本电子厂商的计划并不买帐，也认为他们的未来希望渺茫。
上述三家大厂都提出了自己的核心问题，每家的状况都不一样；其中松下的问题是其所谓“节能”产品的未来性，索尼则持续与其“重新聚焦(refocused)”的核心电子产品奋斗中。而夏普可能是其中最惨的，该公司与其最大客户苹果(Apple)之间的关系显然出现裂痕──因为比承诺的时间晚太多提供iPad与iPhone所需的小型显示器。
本文授权编译自EE Times，版权所有，谢绝转载
本文下一页：松下的未来发展堪虑
相关阅读：
• 裁员潮：AMD砍掉15%，Sony裁减2000人
• 旧貌换新颜，亚洲半导体市场之嬗变
• [图文报道] 在日本CEATEC上畅想智能连接的未来Wpbesmc
{pagination}
一家金融分析机构标准普尔(Standards & Poors)将松下的长期债券评等降至倒数第二低的“BBB”(最低评等为A-)，主要是因为该公司面临钜额亏损，复苏前景也进展缓慢。无疑地，日圆 的强势已经对日本企业造成伤害，但真正棘手的是没有一家公司能提出具说服性的恢复获利计划。
松下的未来发展堪虑
松下日前宣布了新策略，内容包括缩减日本制造产能、停止在海外市场销售手机，以及限制太阳能光电板、可充电电池的投资。松下需要大刀阔斧的变革才能止血，在该公司定义为具成长性的三项业务：即太阳能、锂离子电池与家电中，已经又削减了两项业务的投资。
根据其最新策略，松下将把日本国内的可充电电池生产线减少一半，同时聚焦于非消费性应用领域；该公司也将缩减在马来西亚的太阳能板制造厂投资。此外，松下将停止今年于欧洲市场推出智能型手机的计划，其实该公司是在今年3月才重回欧洲市场。
不过，以“绿色创新企业(Green Innovation Company)”自居的松下可能会发现，在该公司大幅缩减其绿色产品与智能型手机业务的同时，要打造所谓的“节能与智能解决方案”会加倍困难，而这可能是其智能家电新产品是否能成长的关键。
本文授权编译自EE Times，版权所有，谢绝转载
本文下一页：索尼电子产品业务持续萎缩
相关阅读：
• 裁员潮：AMD砍掉15%，Sony裁减2000人
• 旧貌换新颜，亚洲半导体市场之嬗变
• [图文报道] 在日本CEATEC上畅想智能连接的未来Wpbesmc
{pagination}
索尼电子产品业务持续萎缩
索尼预期在这一个财务年度摆脱赤字，但坏消息是，该集团旗下的电子产品业务恐怕难以达成恢复获利的目标。根据索尼公布的4至9月半年度财报，整体净损为 401亿日圆，该数字在去年同期为424亿日圆；亏损减少的主因是该公司出售了化学产品业务部门，使得营运利润在第二季提升了约40%，但这还不足以抵销增加的税务负担。
今年索尼因电视业务导致的亏损幅度缩小，是值得鼓励的，其财报表现也优于预期；但这家公司要脱离困境并不容 易。最大的问题在于，索尼无法证明该公司新执行长Kazuo Hirai在今年稍早前列出的“重新聚焦”产品领域──即数字相机/影像产品、视频游戏机与行动装置──正在将该公司拉回成长的轨道。
相反的，索尼的游戏机与数字相机业务持续萎缩，该公司也坦承，其电子产品业务要在今年摆脱赤字“会很难”。
本文授权编译自EE Times，版权所有，谢绝转载
本文下一页：夏普失信于苹果？
相关阅读：
• 裁员潮：AMD砍掉15%，Sony裁减2000人
• 旧貌换新颜，亚洲半导体市场之嬗变
• [图文报道] 在日本CEATEC上畅想智能连接的未来Wpbesmc
{pagination}
另一家国际评等机构Fitch Ratings甚至在最近将夏普的评等降至“垃圾(junk)”，表示：“在短期与中期内，我们并未看到该公司有任何具意义的核心业务营运改善。”
夏普失信于苹果？
夏普的未来命运显然取决于其手机/平板装置用中小型显示器，而非大尺寸电视机；甚至有人推测，夏普的存亡关键在于能否顺利量产供应苹果 iPhone 与 iPad 的面板。而根据业界消息，夏普显然是已经搞砸了…
据 了解，苹果是在2009年开始寻找新的面板供货商，主要是因为原本的面板供应伙伴三星(Samsung)发表Galaxy系列智能手机产品，让两家公司之间的竞争关系恶化。苹果在面板方面通常是采取多来源策略，少了三星这家主力，苹果不得不积极寻求另一家领导级供货商，而夏普的IGZO与in-cell触控面板技术，获得了苹果的青睐。
在2010年12月，苹果决定协助夏普扩展智能手机与平板电脑面板产能，投资了 1,000亿日圆让夏普得以改装位于日本Kameyama的旗舰面板厂；该据点本来是生产大尺寸电视面板。但根据日经新闻(Nikkei)报导，尽管有苹果出手相助，夏普还是无法以苹果要求的成本为后者生产足够的面板。
苹果在3月份发表的New iPad确实采用了夏普的IGZO面板技术，但报导指出，夏普的新面板交货时间比原先预定迟了近半年。此外，要供应iPhone 5的in-cell触控面板，是在苹果于9月12日宣布推出新一代iPhone计划的同一天，才开始于夏普Kameyama厂量产，延迟交货情况糟得可 以；在关键产品上失信于如此重要的客户，夏普几乎可说是自毁前程。
此外，夏普一直想成为太阳能领导厂商，随着该公司结束在美国、欧洲的太阳光电模块生产，将产能集中于日本，这个希望也宣告破灭；在9月底，夏普为了取得银行贷款而公布的振兴计划中，也包括了太阳能业务的紧缩策略。
本文授权编译自EE Times，版权所有，谢绝转载
参考英文原文： Yoshida in Japan: Tokyo scuttling tech bailouts；Japanese CE giants losing credibility war，by Junko Yoshida
相关阅读：
• 裁员潮：AMD砍掉15%，Sony裁减2000人
• 旧貌换新颜，亚洲半导体市场之嬗变
• [图文报道] 在日本CEATEC上畅想智能连接的未来Wpbesmc
{pagination}
Yoshida in Japan: Tokyo scuttling tech bailouts
Junko Yoshida
NEW YORK – Japan's bureaucracy doesn't like foreign ownership or capital investment in domestic corporations. In the last few months, this aversion has grown more pronounced under the guise of national interest.
That’s troubling.
The word in Tokyo while I was there last week was that the private equity firm KKR, which appeared to be targeting Japanese chip maker Renesas, initially had its eye on Hitachi. KKR wanted to break up Hitachi and spin out several smaller but profitable companies, which it hoped to "harvest" for big returns.
However, as a veteran Japan observer and technology consultant put it recently, “Hitachi is like the Emperor in Japan.” No one dares to touch Hitachi. So, KKR switched its focus to struggling Renesas as its investment target.
But KKR’s low-ball effort to acquire Renesas also fell through. The reason is Japanese bureaucrats quickly put together a government fund along with partnerships with about 10 companies – mostly the company's own customers – in a bid to buy Renesas for 200 billion yen ($2.55 billion).
While Japan’s MCU giant has many problems, a key issue was the slow decision-making process at Renesas. Blame squarely rest with Renesas management. The problem was exacerbated by shareholders like Hitachi, NEC and Mitsubishi Electric, who demanded a say in nearly every Renesas decision over the past two years.
The government's bailout plan calls for piling on more “major” shareholders like Toyota, a customer, potentially hanging an even bigger albatross around Renesas’ neck.
More important is the question of whether its customers should also be among it largest shareholders. Automotive customers like Toyota tend to throw their weight around in negotiating prices with chip companies. That throws at least one big customer into direct conflict with Renesas’ need to maximize its margins.
Renesas is merely the latest example of Japan’s aversion to foreign investment. When Olympus was looking for help earlier this year, two foreign companies, not Sony, sought to invest, according to a source in the financial community. Two potential saviors were Samsung and General Electric. Such an investment by Samsung or GE actually makes sense since each company has experience and a significant presence in the medical electronics market.
Save Sony
But when investment bankers broached the subject at Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), officials there rejected the deal. Said one bureaucrat, according to an investment banker, “If you came here to ask us about foreign ownership of Olympus, the answer is 'NO.' We don’t even want to know the name of the foreign companies interested in Olympus.”
Rather than Samsung or GE, Sony -- with little medical equipment expertise -- agreed in September to pump 50 billion yen ($642 million) into cash-strapped Olympus, making Sony the largest shareholder with around a 10 percent stake.
Some Japanese industry sources believe METI bureaucrats engineered the deal to save Sony. After all, the Japanese consumer electronics giant is in dire straits. It needs new businesses well beyond its traditional TV and video camera products. By investing in Olympus, Sony gets instant access to its strong technology and market share in the endoscope business.
A third example of bureaucratic meddling: Speculation abounds in Japan concerning the future of the Hon Hai-Sharp relationship. Rumor has it that METI is looking for a way to rescue Sharp as Japan Inc. bailed out Renesas. The goal is to deny Taiwan’s Hon Hai (better known in the west as Foxconn) a controlling share in Sharp and it's technology. It’s uncertain how Japan Inc.’s response to the existing Hon Hai-Sharp deal will unfold. There appears to be an effort afoot among Japanese officials to prevent the Taiwanese EMS behemoth from devouring Sharp.
Trying to save people’s jobs and keep Japan’s indigenous technologies from moving offshore in the name of economic security may have been admirable in the 1970’s and 1980’s. In 2012, it looks almost suicidal.
Many foreign observers are mystified about why Japan seems to think it has plenty of time to fix its deepening problems. An even bigger mystery is: Why do the Japanese seem to believe that only domestic players can solve its economic and technology problems?
The Japanese ship of state is taking on water. There is no shame in sending an SOS to every ship within range, even if they’re flying foreign flags.
Japanese CE giants losing credibility war
Junko Yoshida
· As Japan's consumer electronics companies shift from consumer to industrial markets along with "eco" and "smart" products, details are scarce.
NEW YORK -- Sony, Panasonic and Sharp this week outlined their turnaround strategies after posting bleak second quarter financial results with big write-offs. The embattled Japanese companies, however, are scrambling to respond to two simple questions:
1. Is the worst over?
2. What, if anything, will drive their future growth?
The Japanese consumer electronics companies have already made it clear they hope to get out of the money-losing TV business as soon as possible. While they shift their focus from consumer to industrial markets and pitch themselves as developers of “eco” and “smart” products, details remain sketchy and largely unconvincing.
For now, the financial community is not buying their argument and sees little hope in the Japanese electronics companies’ future.
Fitch Ratings, a global ratings agency, downgraded Sharp’s credit to junk on Friday (Nov. 2). “Fitch does not foresee any meaningful operational turnaround in the company’s core business over the short- to medium-term," the company said in a statement.
Similarly, Standards & Poors downgraded Panasonic’s long-term debt to BBB, the second-lowest investment grade, from A-. The ratings company cited “huge” losses and a slow recovery outlook.
Undoubtedly, the strong yen has been hurting Japanese companies. But the real dilemma is that none has been able to tell a convincing story about how they plan to return to profitability.
The trio share some core problems, but each has a different story. With Panasonic, the issue is the future of their so-called “eco” products. Sony continues to struggle with its “refocused” core electronics products. But Sharp may have it worst of all. The company appears to have already damaged a relationship with its biggest customer – Apple, delivering small displays for iPads and iPhones much later than promised.
Panasonic's future
Panasonic this week announced a new strategy that includes scaling back manufacturing in Japan, ending overseas sales of mobile phones and curbing investment in solar panels and rechargeable batteries.
Drastic changes are needed to stop the bleeding. Of three segments Panasonic has identified as growing businesses – namely solar, lithium-ion batteries and appliances, it is already making further cuts in two of them.
Under the new plan, Panasonic will cut domestic production lines for rechargeable battery cells by half, while focusing on non-consumer applications. It will also curtail investments in a solar panel production factory in Malaysia.
Meanwhile, it will halt sales of smartphones in Europe this year, even though it only reentered the European market in March.
So, Panasonic, which calls itself a “Green Innovation Company,” is finding it much harder to create so-called “Eco & Smart Solutions” as it trims most of its “green” products and smartphones, which could hold a fundamental key to the growth of new smart appliances.
Sony electronics shrinking
The good news is that Sony expects to be in the black for its current fiscal year. The bad news is that it probably won’t be able to achieve its goal of returning its electronics business to profitability.
Sony posted a consolidated net loss of 40.1 billion yen for the April-September half, compared to a 42.4 billion yen loss during the same period a year ago. Helped by selling off its chemical products business, the company’s operating profit jumped about 40 percent in the second quarter, but this wasn’t enough to offset increased tax burdens.
It’s encouraging to see the company’s losses from its TV operations are shrinking this year, and Sony’s financial services are generating a better-than-expected profits.
But the company is hardly out of the woods.
The biggest problem is that Sony has shown no evidence that newly “refocused areas” -- digital cameras and imaging technology, video games and mobile devices – outlined earlier this year by Sony’s new chief Kazuo Hirai are putting the company back onto a growth trajectory.
By contrast, sales of game consoles and digital cameras continue to shrink. "A return to the black [in the electronics business] will be difficult" in the current year, Sony acknowledged.
Sharp losing Apple's trust?
It’s clear that Sharp’s future hinges on its success on small- to medium-size screens for mobile phones and tablets, not large-screen TVs. It’s been speculated that Sharp’s survival depends on its ability to ramp up production of panels for Apple’s iPhones and iPad. The company may have already screwed that up, according to a story that appeared in Nikkei, Japan’s economic journal.
Apple reportedly started looking for a new panel supplier in 2009. Apple’s search was triggered by Samsung’s launch of its Galaxy line of smartphones, which soured Apple’s relationship with its Korean rival.
Apple has always had a multiple-sourcing strategy for displays. But without Samsung as its key display supplier, Apple was eager to find another leading LCD vendor.
Apple liked what it saw in Sharp's panel technologies, including its IGZO (indium-gallium-zinc oxide) and in-cell technologies, which integrate touch sensors directly into LCD panels.
In December 2010, Apple decided to go so far as to help Sharp expand its capacity to manufacture panels for smartphones and tablets by providing Sharp with 100 billion yen it needed to remodel its flagship panel factory in Kameyama. The fab was originally built to produce large-screen TV displays.
Despite Apple’s support, Sharp, was unable to manufacture enough panels at the cost Apple demanded, according to the Nikkei report.
Apple did adopt Sharp's IGZO panel technology for the new iPad unveiled in March, but Sharp reportedly missed the delivery date of new panels by nearly half a year..
Further, mass production of in-cell panels for Apple's iPhone 5 only started at Sharp's Kameyama plant on the same day that Apple announced plans to release a new iPhone on Sept. 12. Missing the delivery date is bad enough. But to do so with the critical products Sharp is betting its future on -- for its most important customer – borders on suicidal.
Sharp harbored hopes of becoming a leader in solar energy technology. But that plan also went out the window when Sharp ended production of photovoltaic modules in the U.S. and Europe to concentrate production in Japan. This retrenchment was a part of a turnaround plan the company had to submit to secure bank loans late September.
责编：Quentin
扫码分享到好友
