诞生于1987年的华为(Huawei Technologies)从一家在中国农村贩卖电话交换机设备的经销商，摇身变成今日年营收达340亿美元的全球电信设备大厂，其成功故事在中国商业界总被爱国主义者与钦羡者一再传颂。
而在华为内部，这家公司披荆斩棘的成长之路让员工大多抱持着“处于劣势一方”的心态，驱使他们比任何人都努力向上。华为的工程师通常被竞争对手形容为“狼群”，坚持着想证明全世界看错了他们──该公司的员工普遍认为华为被西方世界否定、甚至是被那些对中国有偏见的人误解；华为就是在这种逆境之中茁壮成长。
现在，这家电信设备业者开始经营自有品牌，想在移动设备(智能手机与平板电脑)市场与三星(Samsung)、苹果(Apple)一较高下，在企业应用市场则是与Cisco、Juniper、IBM、Oracle等互别苗头；华为积极想要实现看来不可能实现的梦想。
华为旗下华为终端(Huawei Device)首席营销官邵洋(Shao Yang)自1990年代末期至2000年初是负责蜂窝式基频设备业务；他表示，华为所有员工──包括他自己──对于公司是如何艰辛地取得今日成就的集体记忆，将有助华为终端取得最后成功。不过邵洋要将华为品牌智能手机推上全球市场领导地位的任务，还有一段路要走。
华为旗下华为终端(Huawei Device)首席营销官邵洋(Shao Yang)
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本文授权编译自EE Times，版权所有，谢绝转载
本文下一页：那么，华为的战略是什么？
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根据市场研究机构 IHS iSuppli 的统计数据，华为在 2012年是排名全球第六大的智能手机供货商，前面还有Blackberry、诺基亚(Nokia)、中兴(ZTE)，以及领先更多的三星与苹果；IHS估计，华为2012年全球市占率约4%左右。
另一家市场研究机构 IDC 的统计数据则显示，华为2012年第四季的全球手机出货量为1,080万支，在当季跃居为全球第三大智能手机供货商，超越LG与HTC，首度挤进全球前五大智能手机供货商排行榜之列。不过邵洋对此仍以谦卑的态度表示：“我们距离三星与苹果还很远，而且这只是2012年第四季单季的数据。”
全球智能机出货量排名
Source：IDC5aSesmc
当然，邵洋坦承，想在市场上胜出是一回事，最难的是如何达到目标：“因为竞争已经很激烈。”那么，华为的战略是什么？
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本文下一页：卖马背上的GSM，推翻西方的“七座大山”
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对于华为来说，面临苦战是家常便饭；邵洋表示，他在1990年代加入华为时，有“七座山”横在面前，包括爱立信(Ericsson)、诺基亚、Lucent、Alcatel、Nortel等等，当时的华为在全球市场知名度非常小。
邵洋当时在华为的研发部门，是该公司首套商用GSM设备的设计团队成员，该产品在1998年问世。他表示，该产品真的不怎么样，与竞争对手产品难以匹敌，无论如何，华为还是向蜂窝式设备业务跨出脚步，虽然销售对象并非富裕的市场，而是中国西北的草原。
“人们那时候形容我们卖的是‘马背上的GSM’，”邵洋回忆：“我们是用直升机来运输GSM设备，再用马匹将机器载到安装地点。”在1998~2000年间，华为的学习曲线呈现往上攀升的趋势，他表示：“我们日以继夜地工作，而且真的赶上了同业的脚步。”
华为的第一次突破是获得了荷兰第四大网络营运商的青睐，该公司当时为了第一个3G网络的布署寻找较小型的GSM设备，但诺基亚却要他们等18个月，因此这家积极抢占市场商机的荷兰业者找上了华为；邵洋指出：“我们派出20位最优秀的工程师，为那家荷兰业者设计新型GSM设备，那套设备有一部分可安装在户外， 一部分则放置在室内。”
来自荷兰的客户为华为开启一扇前往西方世界的大门，但邵洋表示：“我们根本没时间庆祝。”因为不到一 年，荷兰最大电信业者KPN收购了那家华为的客户，也让华为丢掉了唯一来自欧洲的订单。华为的第二次机会来自于Vodafone Spain的订单，该公司藉此机会改善了3G基地台设备的性能与功耗，得以与爱立信、诺基亚等对手比肩。
本文授权编译自EE Times，版权所有，谢绝转载
本文下一页：华为历史上的真正突破，从SingleRAN开始
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不过华为历史上的真 正突破，是直到开发自家SingleRAN技术才开始；SingleRAN是一种能让行动通讯业者在GSM与UMT网络之间切换、或是同时使用这两种标准 的无线接取网络(adio access network，RAN)；该技术需要开发软件定义无线装置以及一套硬件零组件，让网络营运商得以采购、运作并维护单一电信网络与配套设备，同时能支持多种移动通讯标准。
邵洋仍记得，在某个周六，他与华为的一群同事在深圳登山踏青，当时华为终端的现任CEO余承东(Richard Yu)也在，一群同事：“边爬山边热烈讨论我们是否应该开发SingleRAN。”但当时几乎所有爬山成员与他们在山上透过电话联络的人，都否定该想法。
技术门槛、无法预期的产品延迟以及成本，是大伙儿反对开发SingleRAN的主要理由；”总之风险实在太大。”邵洋表示，不过当时余承东一边爬山还是一边坚持应该要做：”如果我们不做，就永远无法打败爱立信。”
华为的SingleRAN取得成功，也让这家中国电信设备业者得以快速成长；根据IDC今年稍早的预测，华为可望在 2013年取代爱立信跃居有线/无线通讯设备市场龙头，爱立信与华为自2010年至2012年一直是全球电信市场的前两大厂商(以营收计)。
华为简介
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本文下一页：由电信设备市场跨足手机终端市场
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由电信设备市场跨足手机终端市场
今日的华为在电信设备市场已经翻越过1996年时还横在眼前的七座高山，现在则是将目光聚焦到终端设备市场；华为是在2003年涉足终端业务，当时3G技术刚起飞，电信营运商缺乏3G终端设备，也让华为在2011年以低阶手机ODM身分进军3G手机市场。
在2011年，拜苹果大受市场欢迎的 iPhone 之赐，手机市场出现剧烈变化；不过绍洋也表示，电信营运商很快地对苹果的强势感到厌倦，有部分业者因此故意提供用户三星Galaxy 2更多价格上的优惠，以对抗苹果。
有 部分电信营运商也找上华为，并警告该公司需要有所改变；他们怂恿华为将手机产品提升至高阶，并由ODM转型为OEM。于是在2012年，邵洋成为华为终端 的首席营销官，并将公司转型做了180度的大转变：“一旦我们决定经营品牌业务，我们就得全力以赴，这是一件正确的事。”因此华为砸下重金，将大部分的手机设 计资源转向开发自有品牌智能手机。
但是华为也在短时间之内为此付出代价──那些未预期华为策略转变如此快速的电信营运商客户出现了抱怨；邵洋表示，华为的ODM业务在2011年有14家营运商客户，大多数在欧洲，但到了2012上半年，那些客户因为华为策略的转变而纷纷转身 离去，只剩Vodafone Italy还继续与华为终端合作。
在2012下半年，华为终端推出了Ascend P1与Ascend D1两款让产业界印象深刻的智能手机；一开始大多数产业观察家都不看好华为的手机品牌，大多数消费者也没听过华为－－特别是尊重品牌的法国等市场，但华为大胆地透过亚马逊(Amazon)销售Ascend系列产品，很快地成为市场上前三大畅销品牌，也吸引了电信营运商的注意。
邵洋自豪地表示：“在2013上半年，我们在全球有超过14家电信营运商采用华为品牌手机。”虽然今日华为终端对整个华为集团营收的贡献度仅20%，其它四 分之三营收还是来自于电信设备业务，但这个新创事业在2012年的整体营收已经达到80亿美元，预测今年可进一步成长至90亿美元，其30%手机业务在中 国，日本、欧洲市场各有约10%左右。
IHS iSuppli资深分析师Wayne Lam表示：“华为在过去几年非常积极打造智能手机系列产品，虽然目前仍稍微落后同业中兴，但预测在接下来几年其整体手机出货量将超越中兴，并因为具备手机核心芯片组件的垂直整合能力，在智能手机市场取得更快的成长速度。”
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本文下一页：掌握芯片设计能力，掌控自己命运
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掌握芯片设计能力
华为旗下的芯片设计公司海思(HiSilicon) 在2004年成立，华为最新的Ascend P2智能手机、也是第一款支持Cat4 LTE的产品，就是采用海思的LTE基频芯片；据IHS的Lam表示：“华为在很多方面追随三星的脚步，包括手机零组件技术的重直整合，以及砸重金行销自 家品牌。”但采用海思芯片的智能手机对华为来说还是很新的尝试。
去年推出的Ascend D1是采用海思的应用处理器芯片(1.4GHz四核心K3V2应用处理器整合16核心GPU)与基频芯片；但Lam表示：“到目前为止，采用海思基频芯片 的Ascend D1尚未获得电信业者的青睐。”Ascend P2是华为第二次采用海思应用处理器/基频解决方案，也还没宣布任何一家电信业伙伴。
Lam表示：“整体看来，海思的命运是与华为高阶智能手机Ascend系列绑在一起，因为海思自家开发的应用处理器是为华为智能手机量身打造。”
不过邵洋表示，站在华为的立场，有海思这样一个伙伴，能让华为终端的设计工程师更方便与芯片设计工程师沟通；他指出，华为终端还是采取多家芯片供货商策略(也采用Qualcomm芯片)，有海思也有助于华为与其它芯片供应来源的协商。
在 被问到华为终端的智能手机发展策略时，邵洋表示该公司在2013年与2014年的目标是专注于增强智能手机硬件能力：“我们将智能手机是为一种‘超级工具组’。”其首要任务是在摄影机、MP3与电话功能方面做到差异化；而到2015年之后，华为的智能手机发展焦点将会有较多转向软件。
本文授权编译自EE Times，版权所有，谢绝转载
编译：Judith Cheng
参考英文原文：Huawei, world’s biggest underdog，by Junko Yoshida
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Huawei, world’s biggest underdog
Junko Yoshida
The ascent of Huawei -- from a reseller of commodity PBX equipment in rural China to a global telecom equipment behemoth with $34 billion revenue today -- is a story told and retold in China.
SHENZHEN – The ascent of Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. -- from a reseller of commodity PBX equipment in rural China when founded in 1987 to a global telecom equipment behemoth with $34 billion revenue today -- is a story told and retold by both the patriotic and the envious in the Chinese business world.
Within Huawei, its “against-all-odds” heritage fuels employees with an “underdog” mentality, driving them to work even harder. Huawei engineers, often described by rivals as “a pack of wolves,” are perpetually determined to prove the world wrong about them (even when the world says they’re right).
Its workers tend to believe that Huawei is a great company underestimated by the West, and worse, misunderstood by those whose worldview is prejudiced against China. And Huawei thrives on this perceived adversity.
Now that the telecom equipment giant is entering new markets such has its own “branded mobile devices” (smartphones and tablets) à la Samsung and Apple, and “enterprise business” (storage, servers, VPN, networking, transactions, etc.) à la Cisco, Juniper, IBM and Oracle, Huawei’s “dream the impossible dream” cliché becomes even more essential.
Shao Yang, chief marketing officer of Huawei Device, cut his teeth in the cellular baseband equipment business from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. He explains that helping Huawei Device achieve its eventual success will emerge from employees’ collective memory -- including his own -- of how Huawei reached the heights it occupies today.
Shao Yang, CMO at Huawei Device
However, Yang’s mission -- to dominate the global market with Huawei branded smartphones -- is still a work in progress.
According to IHS iSuppli, Huawei closed out 2012 in 6th place among smartphone manufacturers, just behind Blackberry, Nokia and ZTE. The others way ahead of Huawei are obviously Samsung and Apple. IHS believes that overall Huawei commanded a little over 4% of the market in 2012.
Meanwhile, the market research firm IDC’s recent data shows that in the fourth quarter of 2012, Huawei, which shipped 10.8 million handsets worldwide, came in the third among smartphone vendors. The fourth quarter of 2012 marked the first time Huawei has ever cracked the top five in global rankings, displacing both LG and HTC, according to IDC.
Remaining humble, Yang pointed out, “There’s still a big gap between us and Samsung/Apple, and that was only one fourth quarter in 2012.”
Of course, having the will to win the market is one thing. Harder is to actually achieve the goal, acknowledged Yang, “because the competition is already there.”
So what’s Huawei’s game plan?
Uphill battle
Facing an uphill battle is nothing new to Huawei. When Yang joined Huawei in the mid-1990’s, “We saw ‘seven mountains’ standing in front of us,” he said. Those included Ericsson, Nokia, Lucent, Alcatel, Nortel and others. Huawei was still largely unknown to the world.
Working at Huawei’s R&D division, Yang was a part of a team who designed Huawei’s first commercial GSM equipment, launched in 1998. He acknowledged that it was “a poor design,” not in the same league with its rivals. Nonetheless, Huawei went about selling the equipment “not in the rich market,” but in “the grasslands of northwest China,” said Yang. “People used to describe it as ‘GSM on horseback.’ We transported our GSM equipment by a helicopter and then we had to carry it on horses to where it needed to be installed.”
In the period between 1998 and 2000, Huawei’s learning curve trended up. “We worked day and night,” said Yang, “and really learned to catch up with the industry.”
Huawei’s first break came when the then number-four network operator in the Netherlands came knocking. This operator, looking for smaller GSM equipment for their first 3G network deployment, was told by Nokia that they’d have to wait 18 months. The Dutch operator turned to Huawei, which was eager for an opportunity in the Western market. “We sent 20 of our best engineers to the Dutch operator, and we designed a new type of GSM equipment. Part the equipment can be installed outside, while another part stays inside.”
Working with the Dutch, Huawei got its foot in the door in the West. But “we had no time to celebrate,” said Yang. Within less than a year, “bad news came. The Netherland’s largest operator, KPN, bought the number four operator we’d been working with.” The acquisition effectively left Huawei with no commercial contracts in Europe.
A second chance developed with a contract with Vodafone Spain. Huawei used this opportunity to improve the performance and power consumption of its 3G base station equipment, reaching par with Ericsson and Nokia.
But Huawei’s real breakthrough didn’t come until it decided to develop its SingleRAN technology. The goal of SingleRAN was to design a radio access network (RAN) technology allowing mobile operators to switch from GSM to UMTS network standards or use both simultaneously.
The technology required development of a software-defined radio device and a consolidated set of hardware components that would allow operators to purchase, operate and maintain a single telecommunications network and set of equipment, while supporting multiple mobile communications standards.
Yang still remembers a Saturday in Shenzhen, when he was climbing a mountain with his Huawei colleagues. The group included Richard Yu who later became the current CEO of Huawei Device. “While climbing, we heatedly debated whether we should work on the development of SingleRAN.” Pretty much everyone in the group, and others they reached via cellphone from the mountain, was against the idea. Technical challenges, anticipated product delays and costs were the main reasons most of the team shied away from the idea. “There were just too many risks,” recalled Yang. Then, while still climbing the mountain, Yu uttered a four-letter word and exclaimed, “We’ve got to do this,” according to Yang.
“If we don’t make this, we can never beat Ericsson,” said Yu.
Shifting focus to Huawei Device
The success of Huawei’s SingleRAN launched the unlisted Chinese telecom gear company into a rapid growth trajectory. Earlier this year, IDC predicted that Huawei is poised to become the market leader in wireline and wireless equipment segment in 2013, overtaking Ericsson. Ericsson and Huawei continue to be the overall global telecom product revenue leaders from 2010 through 2012.
Now that Huawei has pretty much conquered the seven mountains it confronted 1996, the company is shifting focus to Huawei Device. It’s bringing to the division its best and brightest -- including Yu and Yang, leaders of Huawei’s telecom gear business.
Huawei initially got into the terminal business in 2003, when 3G networks were emerging. Operators who were suffering from the lack of 3G terminals to support their network urged Huawei to get into the 3G phone market, in which it served as a low-end handset ODM until 2011.
By 2011, however, the industry trend was clearly shifting, thanks to Apple’s hugely popular iPhone. But operators were quickly wearying of Apple’s arrogance, according to Yang. Some operators deliberately gave Samsung’s Galaxy 2 a break in pricing to subscribers, as leverage against Apple, explained Yang.
Operators also turned to Huawei, but warned, “Huawei, you need to change.” They urged the Chinese company to shift its product line to high-end phones and change its business from ODM to OEM. In 2012, Yang became CMO of Huawei Device, and made the 180-degree turn to OEM. Yang said, “Once we decided to go for our branded OEM business, we had to stick with it. This was the right thing to do.” So, Huawei went whole hog, switching most of its handset design resources to developing branded smartphones.
In the short term, Huawei paid a price. Operators who hadn’t expected Huawei to change so quickly complained. According to Yang, in 2011, Huawei’s ODM business was serving 14 operators -- many based in Europe. In contrast, in the first half of 2012, operators -- turned off by Huawei’s sudden switch in strategy -- shunned Huawei. Only Vodafone Italy signed up to work with Huawei Device.
By the second half of 2012, however, Huawei’s Ascend P1 (introduced at the Consumer Electronics that year) and Ascend D1 were beginning to make an impression on the industry.
Most industry observers initially predicted that Huawei’s mobile handsets won’t stand a chance. Most consumers had never heard of Huawei, and -- especially in markets like France -- people have high respect for brands. Yang, undeterred, started selling Ascend series phones online through Amazon. Huawei quickly became one of the top three brands and started to get operators’ notice.
Yang proudly reported, “In the first half of 2013, we have more than 14 operators using Huawei’s branded phones.”
Smartphone global shipment ranking
source: IDC
Today, Huawei Device contributes only 20 percent of Huawei’s revenue, three-quarters of revenue comes from Huawei’s carrier business group. But, even though it’s still a startup, Huawei Device generated almost $8 billion revenue 2012 with projections of $9 billion this year. Thirty percent of its handset business originates in China, with Europe and Japan at about 10 percent each, according to Yang.
Wayne Lam, senior analyst at IHS iSuppli, said, “Huawei has been very aggressive building up their smartphone portfolio in the past few years. It still trails behind its compatriot ZTE but we predict that Huawei will overtake ZTE in the next few years in sheer handset volume and likely faster in smartphones due to their vertical integration of core silicon components.”
HiSilicon and Huawei Device
So then, how’s HiSilicon -- Huawei’s chip division, founded in 2004 -- working out?
Huawei’s recent Ascend P2 was featured as the first production Cat4 LTE smartphone using HiSilicon’s LTE baseband, said IHS’ Lam. “In many ways, Huawei is following Samsung's formula for growth by going vertical with their handset componentry and putting lots of marketing dollars promoting their brand.”
However, HiSilicon-enabled smartphones are still very new for Huawei, Lam added.
Last year's Ascend D1 was announced with HiSilicon apps processor (1.4 GHz quad-core K3V2 apps processor integrated with 16-core GPU) and baseband. “But to date, no carrier has taken the Ascend D1 with the HiSilicon LTE baseband yet,” noted Lam. The Ascend P2 is Huawei's second attempt at promoting a complete HiSilicon apps processor/baseband solution but it has yet to announce a carrier partner.
“Overall, the fate of their HiSilicon division is tied to the fortunes of Huawei's high-end smartphone Ascend line since they are introducing their home-grown apps processor at that smartphone trim level,” said Lam. From Huawei’s standpoint, though, Yang noted that having HiSilicon as its partner makes it easier for Huawei Device designers to communicate with chip designers. Noting that Huawei Device has a multiple-vendor strategy (they also use Qualcomm), Yang added that having HiSilicon also eases negotiations with other chip suppliers.
Asked about Huawei Devices’ smartphone development strategy, Yang explained that Huawei is focused on beefing up its smartphone hardware in 2013 and 2014. “We see smartphones as a super tool kit,” said Yang. The first order of business for Huawei is to make differentiating improvements in functions such as camera, MP3 and phone, he added.
Huawei’s smartphone focus will shift more to software in 2015, he added.
Huawei at a glance
责编：Quentin
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